

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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The Ordeal of the Russian Peasantry, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i>	295
Reminiscences of the February Revolution (part three), <i>Irakli Tseretelli</i>	301
Adam Mickiewicz, <i>Czeslaw Milosz</i>	322
The Shock-Battalions of 1917 (part two), <i>Victor Manakin</i>	332
Peter Mogila—Metropolitan of Kiev, <i>Hugh F. Graham</i>	345
The Armenian Church in Soviet Policy, <i>Edward Alexander</i>	357

BOOK REVIEWS

The Dynamics of Soviet Society, <i>by W. W. Rostow</i> ; Terror and Progress, U.S.S.R., <i>by Barrington Moore, G. C. Guins</i>	363
Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry, <i>by Walter Galenson</i> ; Soviet Industrial Production 1928-1951, <i>by Donald R. Hodgman, Earl R. Sikes</i>	365
The Allies and the Russian Revolution, <i>by Robert D. Warth, Kenneth Dailey</i>	366
The Importance of Hydro-Technical Projects for Soviet Transportation [in Russian], <i>by A. Lebed and B. Yakovlev</i> ; Characteristics of Dirt Roads in the U.S.S.R. [in Russian], <i>by N. Fedorovsky, Michael S. Mirski</i>	368
Caucasian Battlefields, <i>by W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Richard Pipes</i>	371

Continued on Page II

Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, by Horst Jablonowski and Werner Philipp, <i>Hans Kohn</i>	372
Russia, Poland, and the West, by Waclaw Lednicki, <i>Marc Slonim</i>	374
Moskva kupecheskaya, by Paul A. Bouryschkine; V dome Tretiakova, by Vera P. Ziloti, <i>Valentine T. Bill</i>	377
The Hedgehog and the Fox, by Isaiah Berlin, <i>George Ivask</i>	379
Oxford Slavonic Papers, Volume V, ed. by S. Konovalov, <i>Jack F. Matlock, Jr.</i>	381
<hr/>	
Index to Volume 14.....	383

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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The Ordeal of the Russian Peasantry

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

IT has become increasingly clear, from the course of events since the death of Stalin, that agriculture is the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy. When Beria, former head of the Political Police, was ousted from power in July, 1953, and subsequently executed, one of the charges against him was conspiracy to sabotage agriculture.

When the second big post-Stalin shake-up occurred in February, 1955, and Prime Minister Malenkov resigned, he confessed to incompetence in handling the agricultural situation. There is no reason to believe that Beria and Malenkov were more responsible for the Soviet farm crisis than other leading officials. But there is significance in the fact that when they were cast in the role of scapegoats agricultural failure was emphasized in the count against them.

Further, the amount of attention which is devoted to the agrarian problem in the speeches of such Soviet leaders as the powerful Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khruschev, is a clear indication that this is a subject of constant concern in the higher councils of the Kremlin. There is evidence from Soviet official statements that the system of collective farming which was forcibly introduced with measures of almost incredible brutality twenty-five years ago has proved one of the greatest productive failures in history.

The deterioration in the Soviet livestock situation during a quarter of a century of collective farming is clearly reflected in the comparative figures contained in a speech by Khruschev about a year and a half ago. (Figures in millions)

	1928	1953
All cattle	66.8	56.6
Cows	33.2	24.3
Pigs	27.7	28.5
Sheep and goats	114.6	109.9
Horses	36.1	15.3

These figures are all the more impressive in view of the fact that there has been a substantial increase in population during this

period. The area sown to grain in 1952 was 14.4% greater, the yield per acre 6% greater than in 1913. These gains, however, lagged behind the growth of the population. During the same period yield per acre in the United States increased about 20%.

When one considers that the Soviet government, during the last two decades, poured into agriculture many hundreds of thousands of tractors and other large machines the failure of collective farming, on the human side, is even more striking. Collective farming has meant, in practice, the restoration of a serf relationship between the state and the peasants. And even a large infusion of modern machinery has not made serfdom an efficient system of production.

For centuries the Russian peasantry has experienced the ordeal of being at the bottom of a pyramid of power. Serfdom was the lot of the great majority of the Russian peasants until the proclamation of emancipation by Tsar Alexander II in 1861. The theory was that it was the duty of the peasants to support by their labor the class of landowners, or *pomeshchiki*, which, in turn, was to serve the Tsar in war and in civilian administration.

There were several big uprisings against serfdom during the Troubled Times (1603-1613), when the situation was further complicated by Polish and Swedish intervention and by pretenders to the throne, and under Stenka Razin in 1671-72 and Emelyan Pugachev a century later. But these wild uprisings, accompanied by wholesale looting and killing of landlords and state officials, were always eventually put down and failed to break the bonds of serfdom.

This was done by the voluntary decision of Tsar Alexander II, who told the somewhat reluctant serf-owning nobility and country gentry that it was better to abolish serfdom from above than to have it abolished from below. The liberation of the serfs marked an improvement in the status of the peasants. While there were patriarchal and friendly relations between some landlord families and their serfs, there were inevitably many abuses in the system. After 1861 the peasant was free from the danger of suffering from the caprice or cruelty of a master and was able to keep for himself most of the fruits of his labor.

But the ordeal of the Russian peasantry did not end with the abolition of serfdom. The peasants received only part of the land which they had farmed as serfs and for some decades were burdened with heavy redemption payments. Most serious of all, perhaps, the peasant, liberated from serfdom, was left in many ways under the control of the village community organization. The village com-

mune, in most cases, possessed the land and periodically redistributed it, so that there was little incentive to make improvements. The commune was also held to a system of joint responsibility for taxes.

A great historical opportunity may have been missed when the commune was not swept away along with the institution of serfdom. Had this been done, a class of prosperous, individual peasant proprietors would probably have arisen and the political and social history of Russia would have been very different.

But the village commune, certainly a retarding influence, psychologically and productively, which was calculated to slow down the pace of the more capable and hardworking peasants to that of their more shiftless neighbors, was, curiously enough, cherished both by conservatives and by radicals. Slavophile thinkers saw in the commune an old and peculiarly Russian institution. The government believed that the commune would keep the more unruly younger peasants in order and would serve as an agency insuring the collection of taxes.

And the early Russian revolutionaries of the populist school saw in the commune an embryonic form of socialism, which would make it possible for Russia to avoid the class struggle of the West. The Russian Marxists, of both the Bolshevik and Menshevik schools, disputed this view and favored some form of public ownership as the solution of the land question.

There were considerable peasant disorders in the years 1904-1906, violent seizure of land, burning and pillaging of manor-houses. Peter Stolypin, Prime Minister of Russia from 1906 until 1911, while he put down revolutionary disorder with an iron hand, offered what was perhaps the most hopeful scheme for stimulating the property instinct of the Russian peasant and raising the productivity of Russian agriculture. The social philosophy behind Stolypin's agrarian measures was summed up in a report which he made to the Tsar in 1904, while he was governor of Saratov Province:

"The Russian peasant has a passionate desire to level everyone, to bring everyone to one standard of living; and because it is impossible to raise the mass to the level of the most active and clever the best elements must be brought down to that of the inert and inferior majority. Individual property ownership is the natural antidote to communal ownership. It is the guaranty of order, because the small proprietor is the basis on which stable conditions in the state can rest."

Prime Minister Stolypin carried through two decrees, calculated to substitute individual farming for the peasant commune. The first of these, issued on November 22, 1907, gave every peasant the right to demand from the village community his individual share of land, which he would then farm independently. The second decree, of July 10, 1910, gave every peasant community the right to dissolve itself into an aggregate of individual households, by a majority vote of the members.

But Stolypin's measures came too late. The First World War, with its vast mobilization of peasants, interrupted what had been a fairly wide response to the appeal of individual farming. And when the Tsarist regime fell in March, 1917, the new class of propertied peasants was too small and weak to stem the mass movement for a radical solution of the land problem by confiscating the estates, large and small, of the country gentry. This was an elemental movement, which the Bolsheviks stimulated by their class war and class hate propaganda, but which they did not lead or control.

At the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power, on November 6-7, 1917, Lenin shrewdly neutralized the peasants by persuading the Congress of Soviets to issue a land law which was based on some of the more radical ideas of a rival party, the Socialist Revolutionaries. This Soviet land law called for the abolition of private property in land, for the confiscation of all estates, and the prohibition of hired labor. Land was to be assigned to the peasants who actually worked it in proportion to the size of each peasant's family.

The peasants soon learned that seizure of the land formerly held by landowners was not a complete and satisfactory answer to their problems. For the Bolshevik coup d'état was followed by prolonged and bitter civil war. In the course of this civil war the Soviet government forbade private trade and resorted to wholesale requisitions of the peasants' grain and other surplus products. In theory the peasants were supposed to receive manufactured goods in exchange. In practice, so little was produced in those years of war and shortage of raw materials that the peasants resented the requisitions as armed robbery of the fruits of their labor.

The outbursts of armed revolt in the country districts could be put down by the superior military force at the disposal of the Soviet government. But the passive resistance, which took the form of reducing the planted area, helped to bring the country to the verge of economic disaster. By March, 1921, the Soviet government had won political and military victory and crushed the last organized

resistance of the Whites. But hunger and cold stalked the deserted cities; one of the worst famines in Russian history was impending and the popular discontent was so great that the workers and sailors in the Bolshevik stronghold of Kronstadt, the naval outpost of Petrograd, rose in revolt, calling for "free Soviets."

In this crisis Lenin announced the NEP, or New Economic Policy, which amounted to a truce with the peasants. The hated requisitions were stopped. Freedom of private trade was restored. The peasants, once they had paid a specified income tax, were free to sell their surplus on the market. There was no return of the landlords; but there were loopholes in the Soviet land law which enabled the more thrifty and energetic peasants, despite some administrative persecution as "kulaks," to build up fairly prosperous small farms. It was possible, for instance, for the more well-to-do peasants to lease the holdings of the poor, who lacked working animals and machinery.

The fairly swift recovery of Soviet agriculture from the famine level of 1921-1922 was an impressive tribute to the power of individual incentive. But new clouds appeared on the Soviet agrarian horizon. The Soviet state factories, operating on a basis of high cost and low quality, could not furnish the peasants with an adequate equivalent for their produce. Unable to buy land, limited in their other purchasing possibilities, the peasants began to lose interest in high production.

Confronted with this crisis, Stalin, in 1929, decided to eliminate the individual peasant proprietor from the Russian scene once for all. This was as bloody and ruthless a decision as any taken by Ivan the Terrible. A new, grim phase of the eternal ordeal of the Russian peasantry set in.

The peasants were herded en masse into collective farms, where they were completely under state control as to what they should plant, how they should work, and how much they should receive. The more well-to-do peasants, those who had most to lose by abandoning individual holdings, were "liquidated as a class." Perhaps a million peasant families were uprooted and driven from their homes and land; many of these were deported in fetid cattle-cars to slave labor camps.

Collective farming took another big toll of human lives when the peasants, finding themselves oppressed and defrauded in the collective farms, resorted to their old method of cutting down output and neglecting their fields. The government met this by ruthlessly confiscating foodstuffs and leaving vast numbers of peasants, es-

pecially in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, to die of starvation and related diseases in the second great Soviet famine of 1932-33. As all foreign aid was refused and the Soviet authorities even denied that there was a famine, responsibility for this holocaust falls squarely on Stalin and his associates.

Overt peasant resistance was broken. But terror and starvation have not made the collective farms efficient. It is clear from Khrushchev's facts and figures that Soviet agriculture has been degenerating, not advancing, during a quarter of a century of collective farming. Meanwhile the town population that has to be fed has been steadily increasing, in line with the forced industrial development of the country.

The plight of agriculture takes precedence over all other subjects in Soviet publications. One remedy after another is proposed: ploughing up grasslands in Siberia, going in for corn-and-hog production, decentralizing agricultural planning, sending Communist officials in batches to the countryside. But it seems highly questionable, in the light of past experience, whether any of these measures, or all of them in the aggregate, will be as successful as the remedy which is excluded by Communist dogma and the whole economic set-up of Soviet society. This is restoration of private property in land.

The line of demarcation between areas of abundance and areas of shortage throughout the world coincides remarkably with the line between agricultural systems based on private property and systems where the normal incentives of property ownership are denied or dulled by Communist collectivism or by oppressive systems of absentee landlordism. And Communism, not only in the Soviet Union, but in formerly rich agricultural lands of Eastern Europe, has proved a matchless agency for transforming plenty into hunger and shortage.

The ordeal of the Russian peasantry has been an ordeal of denial of the deeply implanted human instinct for property, especially in the land. It may be expected to continue until that instinct is recognized as a natural right.

Reminiscences of the February Revolution

The April Crisis*

BY IRAKLI TSERETELLI

III

DURING the April demonstrations the chief task of the authorities, the restoration of order, had been performed not by the government but by the Soviet. And to achieve this end, the Soviet had had to resort to extraordinary measures which involved the assumption of certain functions of the executive power.

So long as the crisis lasted and only the energetic action by the Executive Committee appeared able to check the street fighting that might have developed into a civil war, the intrusion of the Soviet into the functions of the government, far from being denounced, was generally welcomed by public opinion and by the Provisional Government itself. As soon as the conflict was settled, however, the problem of strengthening the government was more urgent than ever before.

Even before the April events public opinion had been watching with growing anxiety the increasingly frequent outbreaks of violence and lawlessness in many parts of the vast country already deeply disturbed by the Revolution. In all such cases, whether it was a matter of Anarchists seizing a printing shop, of a military unit refusing to obey orders, or of some provincial committee deciding to declare itself an independent revolutionary authority, the government usually had recourse to the Soviet as an intermediary, relying on this authoritative democratic organization to restore order through moral pressure. Yet, while public opinion prior to the April crisis, had more or less acquiesced in such a situation, accounting for it by the reluctance of the government to use coercion without extreme necessity, now, after the events had exposed the government's impotence, every new manifestation of lawlessness caused a

*This is the third excerpt from Chapter 10 of the author's unpublished reminiscences. The material is copyrighted by the author [Ed.].

deep sense of alarm. The creation of a strong central power was now demanded by people of every political persuasion.

The democratic section of public opinion regarded a closer bond between the government and the democratic organizations, together with a better coordination between its policies and the aspirations of the revolutionary democracy, as the best way to strengthen the government. Accordingly, a considerable part of this democratic public opinion now demanded, with growing insistence, that the Executive Committee participate in the government.

This trend was strongest in the army organizations. On April 23, at the Tavrichesky Palace, a meeting was organized, composed of delegates from regimental and battalion committees of the Petrograd garrison, to discuss the issue of the attitude to be taken towards the Provisional Government. Bogdanov,¹ addressing the assembly on behalf of the Executive Committee, informed the audience of the settlement of the conflict and of the decision of the Executive Committee to resume its former relationship with the Provisional Government. Yet despite the high prestige of the Executive Committee among the delegates, the majority of the speakers recommended that the former policy be replaced by one of direct participation in the government. A resolution was adopted, expressing the wish "that the Executive Committee submit the problem of the relations between the democracy and the Provisional Government to the assemblies of workers and soldiers for discussion, and that the Executive Committee formulate its opinion regarding the formation of a coalition Cabinet."

This resolution reflected the frame of mind of a large element of the democracy. From every part of the country and of the front, from army organizations and peasants' soviets, a flood of letters and telegrams poured into the Executive Committee, all voicing the desire for a coalition government. Some of the frontline and peasants' organizations went so far as to send special delegations to present this demand to the Executive Committee. This campaign found a favorable response inside the Executive Committee, not only among the Laborites (Trudoviki) and the People's Socialists, who all along had advocated coalition, but also among the Social-Revolutionaries.

The Provisional Government, on the other hand, was showered with similar demands for the formation of a coalition government,

¹B.O. Bogdanov was a Menshevik member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet [Ed.].

coming from left-wing bourgeois groups, local self-government agencies, the liberal intelligentsia, the civil service, and the officer body.

Once, during those days, I was stopped in the lobby of the Tavrichesky Palace by V.N. Lvov, Procurator of the Holy Synod. He was smiling benignly and seemed greatly pleased by the change in the public mood. Ever since the beginning of the Revolution, he told me, he had advocated the inclusion of Soviet representatives in the government. "Up to now," he said, "you have opposed it. However, the matter can no longer be postponed. It is impossible to govern Russia without the Soviet democracy. Today this is generally understood. Yesterday some young officers from the staff of the Petrograd military district called on us at the Mariinsky Palace and urged us to accept any compromise, provided the Soviets help us to maintain discipline in the army and in the rear. They don't want Guchkov, they don't want Miliukov, all they want is a government enjoying the confidence of the nation. We in the government," continued Lvov, "feel the same way. Come to us with your program, it makes sense, we accept it. But you must join us in the government."

V.N. Lvov went on in that vein for a long time, and from his words it became apparent that Guchkov and Miliukov, while both were opposed to a closer tie with the Soviet, they were completely isolated in the government. Listening to him, I recalled a remark once made about him by Prince Lvov in conversation with Skobelev and myself: "V.N. Lvov does not rack his brains about program issues," Prince Lvov had said with a twinkle in his eye, "but he is very useful to the government. He is the most sociable of men, with an extraordinary range of connections. He has an infallible flair for the trends of public opinion."

V.N. Lvov, indeed, reflected the sentiments of the man in the street like a barometer.

However, the temper of the right section of public opinion was vastly different.

The right-wing bourgeoisie used the anxiety caused by the April events as a starting point for a political attack on the Soviet. For the first time since the beginning of the Revolution, these circles thought the moment opportune for an open, large-scale, organized campaign to provoke a rift between the government and the Soviet. Dismayed not only by the weakness of the government but also by the general direction of its domestic and foreign policies pursued in agreement with the Soviet, these elements, under the guise of opposition to a

"diarchy," demanded the elimination of any kind of political control over the Provisional Government. The disorganization of the national life, resulting from a devastating war and the collapse of the old order, they attributed solely to the influence of the Soviet democracy, which they also held accountable for the general yearning for peace, both at the front and in the rear. To counteract the policy of cooperation with the Soviet, these groups, led by the Committee of the Imperial Duma, advocated, as a means of strengthening the government, the adoption by the latter of the program of the rightist bourgeoisie with its militant slogan of "war to the victorious end."

In conformity with this point of view, a prominent member of the Cadet Party, Professor Kokoshkin, submitted to the government the draft of an "Address to the Country," in which the government was to ascribe to the Soviet responsibility for the crisis and was to solicit support, in the administration of the country, from the social elements not connected with the Soviet democracy.

This proposition was vigorously opposed by the majority of the ministers. Not only Kerensky, Nekrasov, and Tereshchenko, who represented the left wing of the Provisional Government, but also Prince Lvov, supported by Konovalov, V.N. Lvov, and Godnev, refused to break with the Soviet democracy. Nekrasov, who kept me informed about the situation inside the government, told me that even the Cadet ministers closest to Miliukov, Manuilov, and Shingaryov, objected to this version of an address to the nation which meant a rupture with the democratic organizations born of the Revolution.

The coming governmental crisis came into the open with the publication, on April 26, of the official version of the "Address of the Provisional Government to the Country." It declared that the Provisional Government had decided to seek a solution of the crisis, as desired by democratic public opinion, by inviting representatives of the Soviet to join the government.

I shall quote here a few passages of this "Address," vividly reflecting the moral atmosphere of that first period of the Revolution. The "Address" began with the enumeration of all the acts of the government in the domestic and foreign fields undertaken in agreement with the Soviet democracy. Next came the following description of the administrative methods applied by the first government of revolutionary Russia:

Called into life by a great national movement, the Provisional Government regards itself as the executor and guardian of the people's will. It bases the administration of the state not on force and coercion but on the voluntary obedience of free citizens to the authority created by them. It relies not on physical but on moral force. Ever since the Provisional Government has been established in power, it has not once deviated from these principles. Not a single drop of the people's blood has been shed through its fault, nor has it set up forcible obstacles to any trend of public thought.

This guileless, idealistic faith in the possibility of replacing the coercive functions of power by moral persuasion was characteristic of the initial period of the Revolution, and even the right-wing elements did not reject it at the time. The February upheaval had been christened "the bloodless revolution," and all new Russia took pride in the fact that the downfall of the centuries-old Tsarist order had been so painless, without the streams of blood that had accompanied all former revolutions. Not only the socialists but also the bourgeois democracy cherished the hope that a democracy would be able to govern the nation without recourse to the repressive measures identified in the public mind with the tyrannical methods of the past, now loathed by all. For the time being even the rightists had reconciled themselves to this attitude, all the more so because this position of the new authorities had saved the representatives of the old regime, now in the hands of the government, from stern retaliation.

In discussing the text of the "Address," the government had regarded as debatable, not the statement about the new administrative methods quoted above, but that part of the text which dealt with the difficulties faced by the government in the task of maintaining law and order: the anarchic activities of certain groups and the violations of democratic discipline. The initial draft, as drawn up by Professor Kokoshkin, ascribed the responsibility for such acts to the Soviets, accusing them of trying to undermine the authority of the government. However, the majority of the ministers, overruling the objections of Guchkov and Miliukov, eliminated these attacks on the Soviets from the government's final version and replaced them with the following objective description of the difficulties and dangers confronting the Revolution:

Unfortunately, the cause of freedom is greatly endangered by the fact that the formation of new social ties that would hold the nation together lags behind the process of disintegration caused by the collapse of the old political system. Under these conditions, and after the repudiation of the old coercive methods of government as well as of the external artificial devices formerly employed to

raise the prestige of the authorities, the difficulties of the task that has fallen to the Provisional Government threaten to become insuperable.

The elemental striving of various social groups to realize their desires and their claims, as it is now increasingly displayed by ever less conscious and less organized layers of the population, threatens to destroy the civic cohesion and discipline. It creates a favorable soil, on the one hand, for acts of violence sowing the seeds of bitterness and enmity to the new order among those injured by them, and, on the other, for the growth of special interests and aspirations to the prejudice of the general interest, as well as for the evasion of the duties of citizenship.

The Provisional Government considers it its duty to declare plainly and unequivocally that such a situation makes it extremely difficult to govern the country and threatens, as it further develops, to lead the nation to internal disorganization and to defeat at the front.

Russia is faced with the frightful specter of internecine war and anarchy, threatening freedom with destruction. There is a somber and grievous road well known to the history of nations—the road leading from freedom, through civil war and anarchy, to reaction and the return of despotism. This road should not be that of the Russian people.

The "Address" concluded with a call to the citizens to support the authority of the government through example and persuasion and with the announcement, in the following terms, of the government's decision to invite representatives of the Soviet to join it:

The government, on its part, will resume, with greater determination, its efforts to enlarge its membership, by inducing those active creative forces of the nation which up to now have taken no direct and immediate part in the administration of the country, to join in the responsible governmental work.

The "Address" was received with notable approval by the greater part of the public. Within the majority of the Executive Committee opinions varied regarding the expediency of joining the government: the Social-Revolutionaries were in favor of it, the Social-Democrats were against. There was agreement, however, about the necessity to respond to the government's step with an expression of confidence and with actions intended to strengthen its authority.

Within the Cadet Party the differences of opinion were more substantial. While the Moscow City Council, on the motion of its Cadet members led by Astrov, went on record in favor of a coalition government, the newspaper *Rech*, inspired by Miliukov, warned against illusions about a coalition: "It is quite possible," wrote the Cadet organ, "that the disease requires a more radical treatment," implying with these words a break with the Soviets and the formation of a strong dictatorial power based on the propertied classes.

This rightist trend found its most effective expression the day

after the publication of the "Address," at the anniversary meeting of the Imperial Duma.

The 27th of April was the eleventh anniversary of the convocation of the First Duma. The Committee of the Imperial Duma, headed by the president of the Fourth Duma, Rodzianko, decided to celebrate that day by a solemn meeting of members of the four Dumas at the Tavrichesky Palace, in the "White Hall," former assembly room of the Duma. The declared purpose of the meeting was the discussion of the national issues brought to the fore by the crisis. At the same time the organizers of the anniversary meeting wished to remind the country of the Duma and of the part it had played in the overthrow of tsarism. The public reaction to this would enable them to estimate whether there was a chance that a resurrected Duma—with a bourgeois majority—might become an authoritative permanent organ, to exercise political control over the government in place of the Soviet.

The meeting, coinciding with a moment of general anxiety, aroused keen interest both in the country and beyond its borders. The Provisional Government, led by Prince Lvov, as well as representatives of allied and neutral powers were present. The Executive Committee attended in a body, occupying the box of the Imperial Council. The visitors' gallery was crowded to overflowing, mostly with members of the Petrograd Soviet.

Rodzianko was in the chair. He opened the session with a program speech in which he described the role of the Duma in the overthrow of the old regime and the establishment of the new democratic system. Underscoring in this way the solidarity of the Duma with the Revolution and avoiding any direct criticism of the Soviet, he yet emphasized two basic points on which there was a divergence of opinion between the rightist groups and the Soviets. In foreign policy, he repudiated the campaign for a democratic peace in favor of the old slogan of war to the end, "until full victory over German imperialism." In the domestic field, Rodzianko demanded that the Provisional Government be freed from any political control over it: "The country must give its full confidence and voluntary obedience to the single power it has created and which for that reason it has to trust. Active interference in the decisions of the government is inadmissible. The Provisional Government will be unable to fulfill its functions unless it has at its disposal all the might and strength of the supreme power in the state."

These two salient points: the endowment of the Provisional Gov-

ernment with the fullness of power and the restoration of the old war aims, were the recurring theme of all the right-wing speakers at the meeting. They avoided outright polemics against the Soviet democracy; yet the gist of all their speeches was the contention that the salvation of the country was dependent on the elimination of the influence of the Soviet democracy on policy-making, especially in the field of foreign affairs.

The address of Prince Lvov, who spoke on behalf of the Provisional Government, revealed a very different frame of mind. With great political tact he abstained from putting before the assembly the issue of the governmental crisis, which had been so forcefully and candidly expounded in the Government's "Address to the Country" the day before. Prince Lvov spoke of the spiritual essence of the Russian Revolution and made it unequivocally clear that the government of revolutionary Russia would not seek the salvation of the country in the methods recommended by the rightist speakers. With particular force he defended, in the terms of the Slavophil philosophy close to his heart, the orientation of the foreign policy towards a general democratic peace. He said:

The great Russian Revolution is truly miraculous in its majestic, peaceful course. What is so miraculous about it is not the fairy-tale character of the upheaval, not the colossal scope of the change, not the strength and swiftness of the assault on the ruling power, but the very essence, the guiding idea of the Revolution. The freedom of the Russian Revolution is imbued with elements of universality. The idea sprouted from the tiny seeds of liberty and equality cast upon fertile soil half a century ago encompasses today the interests not only of the Russian people but of all the peoples of the world. The soul of the Russian people has revealed itself as essentially a universal democratic soul. It is ready not only to merge with the democracy of the whole world but also to take the lead and to guide it along the path of human progress based on the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

The speech of Prince Lvov, obviously intended to stress the inner accord between the policies of the government and the aspirations of the Soviet democracy, had no effect whatever on the right-wing speakers who followed him. Only when speaking of the past, of the Duma's opposition to the old regime, of its part in the February events, and of the first days of the Revolution, did they sound conciliatory notes towards the Revolution. But as soon as the acknowledged leaders of the Duma, Rodichev, Shulgin, Guchkov, and others, touched upon current policies, all the fire of their eloquence was directed against the revolutionary democracy. The culminating

point of their attack on the Soviet's policies was the speech by Shulgin.

Shulgin was one of the most eminent and original orators of the Duma. Speaking, now with wistful lyricism, now with irony and restrained passion, he recounted how, under the effect of the defeat of 1915 and the manifest inability of the old system to cope with the situation, he and some other rightist Duma members had sought a rapprochement with the opposition and, together with the whole body of the Duma, had taken part in the overthrow of the old order. "We cannot disavow the Revolution," he said, "we are linked with it, we are welded to it, and for this we bear the moral responsibility." Yet these admissions were made only to give stronger emphasis to the "grievous doubts" with which Shulgin and his friends regarded the system that had emerged from the Revolution. "Despite all the achievements of Russia in these two months," he continued, "the question arises whether Germany may not have made the greater gains. Why is this so? What are the reasons for it? For one thing, the honest and talented government, which we should like to see invested with the plenitude of power, is in reality powerless because it is treated with suspicion. A sentry stationed to watch it was instructed: 'Look out, these are bourgeois, keep a sharp eye on them, and if anything happens, you know your regulations.' Gentlemen, on the 20th of April you had occasion to see for yourselves that the sentry knows his regulations and performs his duty faithfully. Yet it is questionable whether those who have assigned the sentry to his post have done right."

In the same sarcastic, impersonal way, without naming the Soviets directly, Shulgin subjected to ruthless criticism the whole system of the mutual relationship between the government and the Soviet and intimated that the Soviet influence was a source of anarchy and would finally wreck the state. He listed various features of the Soviet foreign and domestic policy, presenting them in an utterly distorted form. Parodying Miliukov's famous speech against Stürmer and the Tsarina, he asked after each of his charges against the Soviets, "what is it, stupidity or treason?" He gave the answer himself: "Each of these actions taken separately is an act of stupidity, but taken all together they add up to treason."

Shulgin formulated his accusations without asperity, always in the same ironic manner, and without ever mentioning the Soviets directly. "Demonstrations are being organized against imperialist war aims," he went on, "peace at any price is being preached, soldiers

are being incited against their officers. Isn't this the best way to set us at odds with our allies and to disorganize the army? Agitators are being sent to the villages, where they create anarchy and confusion. Is it not plain that the only result will be to leave Petrograd, Moscow, the army, and the northern provinces without bread?"

The remarkable thing about this speech was the fact that Shulgin, in voicing these charges, chose to completely ignore the conditions created by the war and the break-up of the old order. He forgot that the revolutionary intelligentsia at the head of the Soviet organizations enjoyed the confidence of the army only because of its peace program, which reflected the yearnings of the masses at the front and in the rear; and that these leaders had used this confidence not only to promote the political peace campaign but also to restore discipline in the army and to prevent the front from disintegrating. He forgot that if the struggle against agrarian violence was having any success, this was due entirely to the revolutionary democracy, which, in defending organized land reform, set the full weight of its authority against the spontaneous, lawless acts of the peasantry.

When I interrupted Shulgin from the floor to ask at whom he was directing his accusations, he still did not name the Soviets but referred to "people from the Petrogradskaya Side"² acting "under the label of Lenin."

At that moment, however, his assertions were wrong even with respect to Lenin, since the latter, aware of the general hostility to him in the ranks of the revolutionary democracy, had been compelled to disclaim the idea of a separate peace and was still hesitating to incite the masses to violence, waiting for the time when the majority of the democracy would be won over to the principle of dictatorship.

Yet these circumstances had no significance for Shulgin. Actually he aimed his arrows above Lenin's head at the foe he considered most dangerous, the democracy. After all, Lenin was only preaching dictatorship, while the Soviet democracy, as Shulgin and his set saw it, was already practicing dictatorship in what seemed to them the worst possible form.

Shulgin's vivid and forceful speech, interpreted by the audience precisely in this sense, made a strong impression. The majority of

²One of the main sections of Petrograd in which was located the villa of the well-known ballerina Kshesinskaya. This spacious villa was seized by the Bolsheviks at the beginning of the Revolution and became the headquarters of the Bolshevik Party.

the deputies and a part of the public in the gallery gave him a prolonged, tumultuous ovation.

I took the floor immediately after Shulgin, and my appearance on the rostrum was used by the leftist sector of the Duma and the democratically-minded public in the boxes and the gallery to give an even more enthusiastic ovation for the Soviet democracy.

To show how we put our case against the right-wing bourgeoisie before the nation, I shall quote here the essential passages from the stenographic record of my speech:

I shall begin with replying to all the questions put here by Deputy Shulgin. (Applause). This was his first question: "Does our Provisional Government, whose integrity is doubted by none, possess the fullness of power? Are we not witnessing the spectacle of the sapping of its power, with sentries posted at the door of the Provisional Government and told: 'These are bourgeois, be on the lookout!'" Gentlemen, to this I can reply with the words of a member of the Provisional Government, N.V. Nekrasov who asks the meaning of "fullness of power." This is what Nekrasov said: "The Russian people have not overthrown one autocrat in order to install twelve autocrats in power." And before making charges against all those who refuse to regard the Provisional Government as a group of twelve irresponsible autocrats, Deputy Shulgin should have asked the Provisional Government itself how it views its situation. I know, gentlemen, that in the circles to which Shulgin belongs recriminations are heard not only against the "Petrogradskaya Side" but also against the organ that embodies the Russian Revolution, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Soviet stands for control over the Provisional Government because, as a powerful democratic organization, it expresses the yearnings of the broad masses of the population: the working class, the revolutionary army, and the peasantry. The position of the Provisional Government would have been immensely difficult, and at the moment of the Revolution it would have been unable to cope with its task, were it not for this control, were it not for this contact with the democratic elements. (Applause). The member of the Duma, Shulgin, has said: "You are telling the people—these are bourgeois, keep them under suspicion." There is some truth in this sentence. We do tell the people: "these are bourgeois, this is the responsible organ of the bourgeoisie, the Provisional Government; but to this we add: this is that organ of the bourgeoisie, these are those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have accepted a general democratic platform, who have agreed to defend Russian freedom together with the entire democracy and have decided to make common cause with the democracy." (Stormy applause).

Gentlemen, when we survey the work of the four Imperial Dumas, we note one common feature, their impotence, their utter helplessness in the field of constructive statesmanship, a helplessness to which Deputy Shulgin has called attention. Many have tried here to lay a finger on the cause of that impotence. There were frictions, they have said, differences of opinion. Of course, there were differences in the Duma; they reflected the differences in the nation, and these differences have been a cause of the failure of all previous revolutionary attempts. But, gentlemen, I wish to call your attention to the following:

the left-wing section representing the democracy, the proletariat, and the revolutionary peasantry, that section knew how to combine its class interests with a general democratic platform acceptable to the whole nation, and it has called the bourgeoisie to take its stand on the common democratic platform. And if the bourgeoisie at first failed to respond to this call, it was not because this step would have required it to renounce its class interests, no, it only required it to realize these interests by revolutionary means. Today, in the brilliant light of the Russian Revolution, it has become manifest that this platform is the only one capable of rallying all the live forces of the nation. And so, gentlemen, all the aims of the Russian Revolution, and even its very fate, are dependent on whether the propertied classes will understand that this is a national platform and not one of the proletariat alone. The proletariat, to be sure, has its own ultimate class aims, yet for the sake of this common democratic platform, for which the conditions are already ripe, it abstains for the present from the realization of its own ultimate class aims. Will the propertied classes be able to rise to this level? Will they be able to renounce their narrow group interests and take their stand on the common national democratic platform? (Applause).

From this general standpoint I dealt with all the questions raised by Shulgin.

Concerning the agrarian violence and the land seizures by the peasants, which Shulgin, without naming the Soviets, had nevertheless attributed to the influence of Soviet agitators, I reminded the audience that the demand for the transfer of the land to the peasantry was by no means a partisan-socialist demand of the Soviets but a national claim of long standing, raised by the Russian democracy whenever it had had the opportunity to speak out freely. While pressing this demand, I said, the Soviets were using their immense authority to impress on the peasants the necessity to carry out this radical land reform in an organized way, through a decision of the Constituent Assembly and not through illegal seizures. Only in the cases of landowners refusing to sow their fields, did the Soviets call for extraordinary measures accomplished not in an arbitrary way, but in full accord with the agencies of the government and the organs of the democracy.

As for the peace campaign which, according to Shulgin, was the primary cause of the disintegration of the army, I reminded the assembly that this campaign was being conducted in agreement with the army organizations which were the sole factor holding the army together since the collapse of the old order. I pointed out that, given the general longing for peace, the fighting capacity and discipline of the army that we were striving to strengthen could be maintained only if the troops could be convinced that the government

was doing everything in its power to bring closer the conclusion of a general democratic peace.

I quoted the words spoken a moment before by Prince Lvov who stressed the aspirations of the liberated Russian people towards the achievement of democratic aims in domestic as well as foreign policies. I welcomed this declaration of the head of the Provisional Government and I said:

I am deeply convinced that so long as the government persists in this course, so long as it states the aims of the war in accordance with the expectations of the Russian people, the position of the Provisional Government will be stable and "the people from the Petrogradskaya-Side" mentioned by Shulgin will not be able to shake it, nor will the irresponsible elements of the bourgeoisie, which do not recoil from a civil war, succeed in undermining it. (Applause). Deputy Shulgin has spoken of the anxious days we have just lived through. He has tried to lay the responsibility for those anxious days at the door of "the people from the Petrogradskaya-Side." I shall have something to say about those people later, but now to you I say this: It was the slogans put forward here by Deputy Shulgin, it was precisely these slogans that nearly touched off a civil war; and the Provisional Government displayed extraordinary, statesmanlike wisdom, an extraordinary understanding of the historical moment, when it issued the clarification of its note so as to preclude any possible misinterpretation.

I told Shulgin that his own position on the main issues of foreign and domestic policy was evidence neither of stupidity nor of treason, but of narrow vision, limited by class prejudice, which prevented him from realizing that propaganda against the democracy was the surest way to strengthen Lenin and his party.

I went on to say, alluding to Lenin's behavior during the April events, that Shulgin's allegation that Lenin had been inciting violence was false. I said:

Lenin conducts a campaign based on ideas and principles, and his propaganda feeds on the irresponsible public utterances of Deputy Shulgin and many others from among the so-called moderate propertied elements. This, of course, makes a certain section of the democracy despair of the possibility of an understanding with the bourgeoisie. Lenin's platform is this:—Since there exists such a trend in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, since the bourgeoisie is unable to understand the general national exigencies of the moment, it should be eliminated, and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies should assume the full power. You may dispute Lenin, you may disagree with him. I myself disagree with him since I am deeply convinced that the ideas of Deputy Shulgin cannot be those of the Russian bourgeoisie. But if I did believe for a moment that these ideas are shared by the entire propertied class, I should have said that there is no other way in Russia to save the conquests of the national revolution than the desperate attempt to proclaim at once the dictator-

ship of the proletariat and the peasantry. For it is these ideas that involve the only real threat of a civil war. If they should triumph within the Provisional Government, this would be the signal for a civil war.

I concluded with the expression of my faith that the victory and the consolidation of the all-national revolution in Russia would awaken the forces of a democratic revolution in the whole world:

In my opinion, citizens, members of the Imperial Duma, the present meeting should not create the impression that there is confusion in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, that there is vacillation, that there is a conspiracy in the ranks of the bourgeoisie with the purpose of driving the Provisional Government to irresponsible acts, for I maintain that this would be the first step toward wrecking the Russian Revolution, and wrecking the country itself. Let the Provisional Government continue on the road of understanding it has chosen; let it pursue the ideals of democracy with increased determination, both in its internal and in its foreign policy. If it does this, the democracy will support this revolutionary Provisional Government with the whole strength and weight of its authority, and in a concerted effort of all the live forces of the nation we shall carry our revolution to completion and maybe spread it to the whole world. (Stormy applause at the left and in the center.)

I have never cherished any illusions regarding my oratorical gifts. In the Duma the flower of the Russian intelligentsia was represented, and many of its members in the audience, had, of course, a greater mastery of the spoken word than I. Nonetheless a truthful account of what the revolutionary democracy was striving for and was doing in order to save the country made a stronger impression on the audience than the well-polished oratory of the speakers who opposed our point of view. It is for this reason that my speech called forth quite an unusual ovation, from not only the left-wing section of the Duma, the members of the Executive Committee, and the Soviet, but also from many of that part of the audience which had cheered Shulgin. Rightist Duma members whom I did not know were coming up to me to shake hands. The next day, a bourgeois newspaper with a wide circulation, the *Russkaya Volya*, devoted an editorial to my speech, expressing the view that the salvation of Russia should be sought not in the course of action advocated by the rightist speakers but in that pursued by the leading majority of the Executive Committee.

Let me note, however, two harshly critical comments on my speech. One came from the American Consul, Winship. In a report to the Secretary of State on the anniversary meeting of the Duma, he denounced my views on foreign policy and voiced the opinion

that the "sectarian spirit and fanaticism" of the socialists, which he saw reflected in my "fervent defense of Lenin," represented "the greatest danger to Russia at the present moment." "Tseretelli," wrote the American Consul, "had often delivered fiery speeches against Lenin and his ideas in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, yet he proved ready to defend Lenin's cause against the spokesman of the bourgeoisie."³

The other sharp criticism, from opposite motives, came from Lenin himself. In an article entitled "I.G. Tseretelli and the Class Struggle," Lenin argued that in assenting to an agreement with a part of the bourgeoisie I had abandoned the principle of class struggle, and in characterizing the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry as a "desperate attempt" I had betrayed the principles of democracy.⁴

At the close of the session Guchkov put in an appearance and unexpectedly took the floor for a speech that proved his farewell address, for two days later he left the government. Guchkov delivered, or, rather, read his address with intense emotion. With his usual forceful eloquence he expressed his yearning for a strong executive power, his dissatisfaction with everything that had been erected on the ruins of the old order, and his unwillingness to understand the new aspirations and needs of the country. He failed, however, to indicate a way out of the existing situation; he could not have done it, since it was clear that any real basis for the establishment of a bourgeois dictatorship did not exist.

This first open attack on the Soviets by the right-wing bourgeoisie did not find the sympathetic public response expected by those who initiated it. Of the two political flanks, the wealthy bourgeoisie on the one side and the Soviet democracy on the other, the middle classes still overwhelmingly preferred the Soviets.

The general interest of the nation continued to be centered on the problem of a reorganization of the government that would ensure for it the greatest possible support by the Soviet democracy.

The position of Kerensky within the government had become very difficult. During the April events he had remained in the background, being unable either to prevent or to mitigate the conflict between the government and the Soviet democracy.

Now, with the other left-wing members of the government, he

³Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Russia, Vol. I, pp. 59-60.

⁴*Pravda*, April 29, 1917.

favored the formation of a coalition and he informed the leaders of the Social-Revolutionary party, Chernov and Gots, that he was determined to resign unless the coalition were put into effect.

On the day the government's "Address to the Country" was published, Kerensky issued a letter, composed for him by Chernov, in which he declared that, having joined the government on his own responsibility, in order to serve as a connecting link between the government and the democracy of the laboring classes, he no longer could remain in the government without a formal mandate. The national situation, he wrote, had become so complicated, and the forces of the organized labor democracy had grown to such an extent, that this democracy might no longer be able to avoid responsible participation in the government of the country.

During the first months of the February Revolution, Kerensky had enjoyed an immense, giddy popularity. In the Fourth Duma, he had been the leader of the small group of Laborites (Trudoviki) but after the Revolution he declared that he always considered himself a member of the Social-Revolutionary party. At the decisive moment of the Revolution, when the rebellious regiments were marching to the Duma, Kerensky, with characteristic impulsiveness, was instantly fired with such a faith in the victory of the Revolution that he went out to meet the soldiers and declared his solidarity with them in the name of the Duma. He was elected vice-chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and was regarded by the rank and file of the soldiers as closely connected with the Soviet and with a socialist party. Actually, though nominally a member of the Social-Revolutionary party, he was by nature a non-partisan individualist. In his views he was less close to the socialists than to the democratic intelligentsia on the borderline between the socialist and the bourgeois democracy. In the excited atmosphere of the Revolution, his speeches, rather vague, yet echoing the thoughts and feelings of both these groups, aroused a strong enthusiasm at the mass meetings of the soldiers as well as among the plain people outside the Soviets.

Kerensky had the ambition of being a national figure above the parties. It is a curious fact that this man, whose name became the synonym of a weak, spineless government, had a pronounced personal predilection for the exercise of strong, commanding power. Had this tendency been combined with strength of character and organizing ability, he might have played a much more substantial and constructive part in the Revolution than the one he actually performed.

The members of the Executive Committee did not regard him as quite one of themselves. He liked gestures calculated for effect and intended to show his independence of the organization to which he nominally belonged. In his capacity as Minister of Justice, for instance, he released General Ivanov from prison, who in the first days of the Revolution had attempted to lead the troops under his command against Petrograd. When he was denounced for this in the Executive Committee, Kerensky, instead of taking the matter up with this leading organ of the Soviet and explaining his motives, suddenly put in an appearance at a plenary session of the Soldiers' section of the Soviet and delivered a hysterical speech before this mass audience. He spoke of his devotion to the Revolution, of how he had "led the revolutionary regiments to the Duma," of the unjustified criticism directed at him, which he was not going to tolerate, and so on. The audience, uninformed about the whole matter, listened to him sympathetically and, of course, rewarded him with tumultuous applause, which he took as a sign of confidence on the part of the Soviet.

Such incidents caused considerable annoyance to the Executive Committee, and its left-wing members repeatedly proposed that Kerensky be disavowed, a step that certainly would have shaken his political position. However, the majority of the Executive Committee preferred to smooth over such incidents behind the scenes, since, by and large, Kerensky's presence in the government and his popularity were considered valuable assets.

On basic issues, domestic and foreign, Kerensky conformed his attitude to the general line of the Soviet. Miliukov, in his *History*, goes so far as to call him a "Zimmerwaldist." Actually, Kerensky's outstanding characteristic was a kind of high-strung nationalism. The ideology of Russian imperialism and expansion had a stronger appeal to him than, for instance, to Prince Lvov or Nekrasov. Nevertheless, Kerensky, bearing in mind the prestige of the Soviet and the temper of the masses, supported the demand of the Soviet for the revision of the war aims, and defended it in the government against Miliukov, with whom his personal relationship had never been of the best. It hurt his feelings deeply that the Soviet considered his oppositional activities insufficient and used the contact commission to exert a direct influence on the government.

Shortly after my arrival in Petrograd, N.D. Sokolov⁴ invited

⁴Radical lawyer; member of the Executive Committee.

me to his home to meet Kerensky at the latter's request. At Sokolov's house I found Kerensky, Bramson, and some other guests. Kerensky, holding forth in his usual emotional way, was saying that in the Executive Committee Steklov and other leftists were systematically trying to discredit him and to obstruct his efforts in behalf of a rapprochement between the government and the Soviet democracy; that the contact commission was ignoring him in its negotiations with the government; that the Soviet was exerting pressure on the government in a humiliating form, and so on. When I pointed out to him that if he wished to straighten out his relations with the Executive Committee and to prevent further misunderstandings, all he had to do was to establish a permanent liaison with that leading organ of the Soviets, keep it informed of his actions and remain in constant touch with it, Kerensky became even more excited and insisted on his inability to do this, burdened as he was with government work, receptions and public speeches. I remarked that both for his own sake and for that of the common cause the coordination between his activities and the policies of the Executive Committee was more important than any receptions.

Then, he suddenly proposed that we immediately go together to the Executive Committee to clear up any misunderstandings and to arrange for a permanent contact. We drove to the Tavrichesky Palace, and there, at a session of the Executive Committee, Kerensky again complained of being misunderstood by members of the Executive Committee and of the difficulties due to the excessive pressure of the Soviet on the government. Yet, when asked by various members what changes he considered necessary, he evaded any definite statement. He talked at length about his desire to uphold his connection with the Executive Committee, about his excessive burden of work, and left without having satisfied anyone and without having reached an agreement regarding a permanent contact.

Those few members of the Executive Committee who were close to Kerensky, such as Filippovsky and Bramson, tried to explain his inability to establish a close connection with the Executive Committee by his being generally unaccustomed to organizational ties. I had the impression, however, that this was not the main reason for Kerensky's conduct. While he certainly appreciated a nominal connection with the Soviet in view of its enormous prestige with the masses of soldiers and workers, he yet consciously avoided a closer link with the Executive Committee in the belief that so long as he stayed on the boundary between the bourgeois and the Soviet

democracy, he would appear to the country as the exponent of the all-national character of the revolution.

In those April days, when it became known that Kerensky, with the other ministers, had approved Miliukov's note which had provoked the first flare-up of civil war in the streets of Petrograd, his popularity was strongly shaken. The Bolsheviks and some other leftist members of the Executive Committee proposed that Kerensky be deprived of his vice-chairmanship of the Soviet. The majority of the Executive Committee, however, still thought that, despite his weaknesses and shortcomings, he might yet play a positive part for the benefit of democracy. For this reason we protected him against attacks from the left.

In this connection, I remember a characteristic incident in which I happened to have had a part.

On April 29, when the decision of the Executive Committee not to join the government was still unchanged, I was asked by the organizers of the Conference of Front Delegates then in session at the Tavrichesky Palace to act as chairman of the Conference for the day. War Minister Guchkov and Kerensky were to address the assembly. Guchkov, who was to resign on that very day, spoke in a pessimistic vein. After him Kerensky took the floor and depicted the national situation in the darkest colors. Irresponsible people and organizations, he said, were doing everything to sow distrust of the democratic government. "Can it be," he asked, "that the free Russian state is a country of slaves in revolt? I wish I had died two months ago. I should have died then with a great dream: that the new life kindled in Russia would last forever, that we did not need a whip and a club to make us respect one another, and that we could govern our country differently from the old despots."

These words were reproduced with sympathetic comment by many newspapers and found an unusual response among the readers: the papers of the Right referred the remark about "slaves in revolt" to the Soviet democracy, and the democratic press, to the extremists fighting against organized democracy. Yet at the Conference itself, contrary to the newspaper reports that Kerensky's speech had been enthusiastically cheered, it was received coldly by the majority of the delegates, for the over-emotional speaker had talked in nebulous terms and had failed to indicate clearly whom he had in mind.

Kerensky himself must have sensed the bewilderment of a large part of his audience, for, after having left the rostrum, he at once returned to it to ask whether the listeners had any questions.

I put the following question to him: "You have said that there were organizations and individuals putting obstacles in front of the constructive work of the government. Certain groups direct this charge against the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Are your accusations also aimed at this organization, which is the center of the revolutionary democracy and directs its activities?"

Kerensky replied that his words could not have been directed at the Soviet, since he was a vice-chairman of that organization himself and would have left it if he disagreed with its policies. Not only did he have no intention of denouncing the Soviet, but he regarded it as the most reliable bulwark of the democratic system.

After answering a few more questions, Kerensky left the meeting. The assembly, however, still did not feel satisfied. One of the delegates, a member of the presidium of the Conference, took the floor and said in effect:

We have just listened to A.F. Kerensky, and his words have made a painful impression on us. He has accused the democracy of sowing unrest and has urged us to accept the uncontrolled authority of a bourgeois government. Plainly we can no longer trust him. Of all the speakers who have addressed our Conference, Tseretelli alone has our full confidence. We must follow him and the Executive Committee.

This statement, warmly applauded by the majority of the delegates, showed that some members of the Conference, displeased with Kerensky's speech, had interpreted my question to him as an attempt to show the Soviet as opposed to Kerensky and the Provisional Government. This was confirmed by several notes I received from the ranks of the delegates. I was asked why Kerensky was allowed to remain vice-chairman of the Soviet, and whether the question I had put to him was an expression of non-confidence on the part of the Executive Committee. I took the floor again and replied that I had put my question to Kerensky not because I suspected him of enmity to the Soviet but because I anticipated the answer he gave me. My purpose, I said, had been to clarify the situation by obtaining from Kerensky a definite statement of his position which we could use to counteract the slanderous campaign against the Soviet conducted by those who strive to provoke a rupture between the Soviet and the Provisional Government.

After this I made a report to the Conference on behalf of the Executive Committee, in which I described the nature of the mutual relationship between the Soviet and the Provisional Government

and stressed their agreement on all basic issues, notably, the problem of war and peace.

My speech cleared the rather gloomy atmosphere that had settled on the assembly. Before the close of the session, one of the delegates took the floor to declare that the attack on Kerensky by the member of the presidium who had addressed the Conference had been ill-considered; and the latter in his turn made a statement in which he, in effect, took back all he had said against Kerensky.⁶

This incident illustrates the peculiar relationship between Kerensky and the Soviet democracy which I have mentioned above.

(*To be continued*)

⁶After this had been written, I chanced upon the issue of the newspaper, *Rech*, containing an account of this session. The incident described by me, as well as the explanations that followed it, are reported correctly but have been considerably toned down. The chief difference between the *Rech* report and my own exposition consists in the rendering of the speech of the presidium member who spoke immediately after Kerensky and expressed his lack of confidence in the latter.

Rech quotes the speaker as follows: "The delegates from the front have had to listen to a great many speeches during this session. These speeches may have been honest and disinterested, but we are prepared to follow only one of the speakers, who, better than all the others, understands the needs and the sufferings of our brothers in the trenches. This man is Tseretelli. We shall not trust any speeches but his. (Loud applause directed at Tseretelli.)" *Rech*, April 30, 1917.

Adam Mickiewicz

BY Czeslaw Miłosz

ONE HUNDRED years ago, Adam Mickiewicz, Poland's greatest poet, died in Constantinople. He had come there from Paris to organize the Polish Legion which was to take part in the Crimean War on the side of the Allies against Russia. Since that day, the number of biographies, essays, polemics, and even plays and novels, for which he has provided the subject, has been immense. I propose now to present, in condensed form, not a history of his fame, but the main problems raised by his works today; particularly in the Polish People's Democracy.

Mickiewicz can be considered, in a sense, a symbol of the weakness of the interest accorded by the West to the civilizations of Eastern Europe. Copiously translated into the Slavonic languages, his poetry is practically unknown in the countries where his metrics have no equivalent. The French, passing by his monument in the Place de l'Alma in Paris, have heard only his name; tourists know even less. In William Rose Benét's American literary encyclopedia (in any case, in its first edition), searching under M, between Mickey Mouse and Midas, we do not find Mickiewicz. This permits us to reflect a moment on the provincialism that has characterized, up to now, the inhabitants of a world shrunken by technical inventions. Barriers, frontiers, and also the unfortunate habit of dividing nations into "better" and "worse," enclose people in the narrow circle of their national heritage. In saying this, I obviously expose myself to the reproach that, as a Pole, I am over-estimating a local figure. But it does not seem to me that I am biased. I treat the literature of my country more severely than other literatures in order to avoid the mistakes of a false perspective. The metallic tone and, what is more difficult to achieve, the simplicity of diction, which are characteristic of Mickiewicz, I found only in the Elizabethan dramatists and, among the Slavonic writers, only in Pushkin.

In 1945, the nationalized publishing firms in Poland, after the interruption provoked by the Nazi occupation, started to publish very large editions of the poet's works, and now every year the printing presses pour forth hundreds of thousands of copies. This fact does not mean, however, that philosophical and political exegesis is easy. On the contrary, today those Polish historians of literature

who are willing to throw light on it according to the required principles are obliged to perform what amounts to acrobatic feats. It should also be noted that his drama in verse, *The Forefathers' Eve*, which has in Poland the same importance as Goethe's *Faust* in Germany, has not been staged in the last ten years: its anti-Russian spirit as well as its suspiciously religious content evidently being the main reasons for this.

Geography

Mickiewicz was born in 1798, shortly after the partitions of the Polish Commonwealth, near Novogrudek, in the region which, since 1939, has been part of the Byelo-Russian S.S.R. His childhood and early youth were spent in non-Polish ethnical territories. The folklore which strongly influenced him was Byelo-Russian and Lithuanian. The rest of his life was spent in turn in Russia, to which he was deported, and in the West, mostly in France where he lived as a political émigré. By inheritance, he was a poet of that Polish *res publica* where the languages of the "people" from the borders of the Niemen and Dnieper were looked upon only as dialects. Basque, Provençal, and langue d'Oc are similarly considered in France today.

The rivalry of Poland with the Grand Duchy of Moscow for the domination of all eastern central Europe, first with Poland holding the upper hand, then with the two powers equally balanced, ended in a disaster for which history provides few parallels. Here is a paradox: a poet shaped by a specific civilization which exists no longer, rather foreign to ethnical Poland (he had never been to Warsaw or to Cracow), holds the rank of national bard in a state which does not resemble his native region in any respect, neither in its landscape nor in its idiom. Even more ironic is the fact that this friend of the Jews is read in a country where practically all the Jews, and they numbered approximately three million, were wiped out by the Nazis. Without exaggeration, one can say that such a figure, the greatest writer who ever used the Polish language, is a source of complexes. It always brings to mind historical defeats, which provoke not so much a willingness or desire for revenge as a feeling of helplessness and an enforced accounting of old errors.

Russia

All his life, Mickiewicz combatted Russia. The exegesis in the Popular Democracy strives today to prove that he nourished hostil-

ity only towards the Tsarist regime, which is not so simple. He was not a nationalist, in any case, not in the modern sense. The clandestine organization to which he belonged as a student at the University of Vilna saw its allies in the liberal-minded Russian youth. Deported from his province in 1824, he established cordial relations with the Decembrists and later bemoaned their fate in a poem, "To My Muscovite Friends." He was a close companion of Pushkin, and of many other poets who greatly appreciated him and who translated his verse into Russian. However, a perusal of his work convinces us that, free of hatred towards people, he had an attitude towards the "Russian phenomenon" which resembles that of another Pole, Joseph Conrad. Within him, compassion and sympathy were mixed with a horror of the "country empty, wide and open as a page prepared for writing." He asked whether it will be a "divine finger" that will write on it or "the old enemy of God." And he was unable to find an answer. His departure beyond the borders of the Tsarist empire in 1829 was accompanied by circumstances which left a strong mark on him. He had to dedicate his poem "Konrad Wallenrod" (one could read between the lines sentiments not entirely in keeping with external appearances) to Tsar Nicholas I ("Let the name of the Father of so many peoples be praised in all the generations and in all the languages"). Further, we have reason to believe that his mistress, Mrs. Sobanska, was an agent of the secret police; and that it was to her double game (the reports favorable to him), that he owed his voyage to Germany for a "health cure" which was the pretext for his escape.

Extraordinarily sharp criticism of Russia contained in his poems written in the West provoked Pushkin, as we know, to a rebuttal. The "Bronze Horseman" is a reply to Mickiewicz. Pushkin was sufficiently liberal to appreciate that Mickiewicz's blows were well aimed, and sufficiently patriotic to resent what he called blindness, a blindness which compelled his friend to "imbue his verses with venom in order to please the turbulent rabble." It would be unjust to use Mickiewicz's work to create an eternal chasm between the Poles and the Russians—which is what the chauvinists were doing. On the other hand, neither is it just to do what in effect is being done today in Poland, to by-pass, by silence, the conflict between two different national traditions, in politics, religion, and way of life, a conflict that caused the severity of his judgments.

The passion which gives such exceptional force of art to his words when he describes the Russian plains must have been very profound

indeed. It explains, as well, his veneration of Napoleon. (The poet was fourteen years old when Napoleon's troops entered his district.) Let us remember, too, that the "venom" of Mickiewicz was, for many Russians, quite forgiveable. They ascribed it only to the tragic fate of Poland. Belinsky, who in the beginning reproached him for closing himself in a "narrow feeling of political hatred," wrote later on (in his letter to Botkin of December 12, 1840): "Most of all I am tortured now by my attack against Mickiewicz in my hideous article on Menzel. Why! Deprive a great poet of his most sacred right to weep over what is for him the most dear in the world and in eternity—his country, his Fatherland—to curse its executioners, and what executioners!" Today's historians of literature in Warsaw put forward many arguments to back their premise that Mickiewicz saw evil only in the Imperialist autocracy. Yet readers who resort to analogy are eager to see nearly a prophecy in his skepticism as to the future of Russia. Here we stumble upon another paradox: the most cherished poet in a People's Democracy does not help at all to provoke feelings favorable to the Soviet Union.

Revolution

When interpreting all of the history of literature as a struggle between Ormuzd (progress) and Ahriman (reaction), it is necessary to place all the eminent writers on the good side. Progress is imagined as an ascending line, the highest point reached being the Revolution of 1917. In other terms, this can be presented in the following manner: in every epoch there existed a certain optimum of progressivism, and those who achieved that optimum announced that humanity will be raised to an even higher degree of knowledge, until the moment, when at the highest level, the Communist Party would be born. Mickiewicz thus should be a forebear of 1945 when the revolution spread throughout the territory of Poland. It is therefore essential to find proofs that he took the correct position in the class struggles of his time.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the revolutionaries in Poland were young men of the gentry who eagerly seized the ideas of democracy coming from France. These young people rebelled against Russia in the name of patriotism, liberalism, and "contrat social." (Their accomplishment was the insurrection of 1830.) It was evident that they had no understanding of the laws of economy, but, looking at it in a dialectical way, because they aspired to create a

"bourgeois nation," it was a progressive movement within the limits imposed at that moment by the *zeitgeist*. Mickiewicz himself, originating from impoverished gentry, was the beloved poet of that youth. His writings had a great influence on it. The instinctive tendency of that social stratum to side with the plebeians found its expression in the revolt of the "school of romanticists" against the "classicists." They opposed the simple, comprehensible-to-all language (in which Mickiewicz was a master) to the learned, full of literary allusions, constructions of the classicists. Mickiewicz's volume, *Ballads and Romances*, is as much an example of the new subjects (taken from the folklore) as it is of accessibility to the uneducated reader. In this way, it heralded, in a sense, the second great literary revolution which is now going on in the People's Democracies: the transition from the "bourgeois nation" to the "socialist nation" which is accompanied by the struggle of "realism" vs. "formalism."

In his forties, Mickiewicz completely renounced poetry and chose action: as a professor of Slavonic literatures at the Collège de France, as a journalist, as the editor of the leftist *Tribune des Peuples* in Paris (1849), as the creator of the Polish Republican Legion in Italy (1848), and, later, of the Polish Legion in Turkey. The task of the scholars in present-day Poland, who comment on the second part of his life, is thus to show his development towards the Good: "*Zeitgeist*," then, heaved itself up to the level of Utopian Socialism, and, in reality, Mickiewicz considered himself a socialist.

The schema presented is, like all schemas, rather convincing. Yet, when applied to living beings who are full of contradictions (or to living literary works) it leads to many absurdities. If the historians of the past tended to omit social backgrounds, taking interest only in biographical facts and in the influence of writers upon writers (in the case of Mickiewicz these were mainly Byron, Schiller, and Goethe), those of today go to the other extreme, reducing poetry to politics, and are utterly incapable of explaining how it happened that in a remote European province, in a country which had lost out in the game of history, an undisputed genius was born. They are also incapable of explaining the wave of romanticism which simultaneously swept across countries at very different stages in their development. They attempt to draw a straight line from the French Encyclopedists to Communism, but the Romantic reaction against Reason, the cult of feeling and intuition, presents them with a difficult row to hoe. In order to find a way out of

difficulty, they divide Romanticism into two currents: progressive and reactionary, which is a burdensome task. It is easy to guess where Mickiewicz should be classified. Without denying his revolutionary role, we must point out, however, that his *Ballads and Romances* is hostile to the Age of Enlightenment; his poetic drama, *The Forefathers' Eve*, raises a problem which, in the twentieth century, was taken up by the Existentialists; his poem, *Pan Tadeusz*, which gives everyone who reads Polish a never-diminishing joy, was described by the professors of the Polish Academy of Science as "the epic of the birth of the bourgeois nation"—which is, frankly speaking, silly. This bucolic tale, whose style is similar to that of Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea*, and to the verses of Virgil, idealizes the patriarchal past.

As to the Utopian socialism, towards which Mickiewicz inclined in his journalistic phase, he considered it as an expression of "religious feelings." He was the first in France to pronounce the name of Emerson from a university chair, and at the very time that he was editor of the international socialist paper, *La Tribune des Peuples* (among his collaborators were also Russians), he translated Emerson's essays. This throws much light on his opinions. A passionate Republican, he nevertheless turned with nostalgia towards a pre-capitalist civilization. As to Hegel, he disliked the ideas of that philosopher from the time when he listened to his lectures in Berlin in 1829.

Comparing him with the Russian poets of his day, one comes to the conclusion that the main difference lies in his negative attitude towards the emancipation of the human mind from the bonds of religious tradition. At a certain period of his life, there came a violent crisis which led him to overcome completely the "Byronic revolt." The heroes of *Pan Tadeusz*, mediocre, insipid, treated with serene humor, are completely deprived of the melancholic reveries of *Eugene Onegin*.

How does such a complicated personality act today upon readers in Poland? Here again is a paradox, in spite of all the efforts to conceal it. I would not hesitate to affirm that a young man, reading the works of Mickiewicz, is exposed to temptations of a most dangerous kind. Every few pages he falls upon derision of "philosophers," "dubious savants," atheists, in the name of "feeling and faith." Incessantly, warnings of the disastrous effects of "the presumption of Reason" seep into him, which is sad, but true.

Religion

Mickiewicz was a practising Roman Catholic. This did not hinder him from making a scandal during an audience with the Pope when he started to cry: "The Holy Spirit is under the smocks of the French people!" Nor to read Voltaire with ardor in his early youth. He loved neither kings nor princes of the Church who allied themselves with the kings. The Polish Academy of Science holds a few good cards in its hands when trying to prove that Mickiewicz rebelled against the Vatican. This is a rather hopeless task, however. Not only did he not foreswear the confession in which he was raised, but throughout all his writings runs a strong mystical under-current beginning with his early "Hymn upon the Ascension of the Holy Virgin" and ending with short verses which, in his mature age, he noted in the margins of German mystics which he was reading.

If *The Forefathers' Eve* is so difficult to stage in the People's Democracy, it is primarily because its main theme has doubtful pedagogical value. The hero throws a challenge to God, who is responsible for the sufferings of men; his greatest effort, however, brings upon him a state approaching madness; what remains is for him to choose either self-annihilation or to condemn his Promethean élan as a presumption; he chooses the latter course. It does not follow that Mickiewicz can be placed among the defenders, by resignation, of the established order. But he conceived revolutionary action as inspired by prayer, and he rejected its atheistic premises. His biographers, in order to keep in agreement with the official philosophy, ascribe these extravagances to temporary weaknesses, and mention his conversion to Catholicism in 1830 in Rome. In reality, there was no conversion, only ebbs and flows in his zeal in practising his faith. Besides, Mickiewicz also manifested a neat inclination to submit himself to charlatans who called themselves men of God; such was Towianski whom he met in Paris. All this is very far from the picture of him that cautious professors, concerned with remaining in their university posts, would like to see. The situation is highly amusing, because, in commenting upon Mickiewicz's texts, they must make grimaces like a devil when sprinkled with holy water.

Realism

Mickiewicz's verse is so simple, so in accordance with the rhythm of every-day talk, that even a child can understand him. It confirms the validity of the forgotten theory of the Greeks that poetry

is the imitation of nature. There is no superfluous eloquence, no rhetoric; that on the other hand, things and men are shown without fear of a fullness of description which today forces poets to stop their phrases in the middle. Of course, the impression of facility is illusory; as in a good athlete, it comes from long training. Under the surface of the "common style" are hidden his metrical discoveries. Mickiewicz read with ease, in the original, Virgil, Horace, and Catullus.

"His art achieves such a high level because it is realist," the officials assure us. We have no reason to object to that, just as we have no reason to object to the statement: "Birds are birds because they are not quadrupeds." The only trouble is that no one in the world has as yet succeeded in defining the word "realism." A few Dutch still-lifes are enough to agonize those specialists who continually debate the meaning of this concept. Their rules, advanced by them to the artists, provoke an effect exactly contrary to that desired.

"Imitation of nature" is probably possible only in epochs when the universe appears to the human eye as worthy of reverence and admiration. At such times, the roundness of an apple, the line of a woman's throat, are *representatives* whose beauty an artist feels he cannot exhaust. He pursues, in their color and their lines, something which is impossible to grasp. Trying to give to an American reader an idea of the magic of Mickiewicz, George Rapall Noyes, with excellent discernment, compared him to the English "metaphysical poet," Thomas Traherne. Who more than Traherne symbolizes in the history of world literature such child-like joy given by the most ordinary of things, only because they exist? On the contrary, one could not quote a better example of an opposite phenomenon than the products of the "socialist realism"; on them is the curse of greyness and of the dematerialization of the objects. "Imitate the realism of Mickiewicz!" poets are advised in Warsaw today. One might as well ask the electric bulb to glow when the wire is cut.

Conclusions

Having to deal with such a disturbing writer, who continues to maintain his status as the foremost poet and who concentrates in his person all the paradoxes of Poland, it would, perhaps, be wise just to pay respect to his art and only bow one's head in regret over the strange injustice of history which calls upon great poets in the

periods of superstition, and refuses them to the periods of enlightenment. The method of literary research, which consists of creating an image of what should have been a dead man whom we cherish while disregarding all uncomfortable details of his life, however well-tried (Mickiewicz, until 1939, was similarly exploited by the Rightists), rarely brings respect to the exponents of Progress. In recent years, many holders of university chairs in Poland have faithfully followed this method. To the credit of writers more aware of the charm of Mickiewicz than the theoreticians, we should say that the sight of these acrobatics caused some long faces. A certain slight liberalization in 1954-55, and the anniversary of Mickiewicz's death, provided them with an opportunity to protest openly.

"What are we telling our youth about Mickiewicz?" asks the poet Jastrun (in the weekly, *Nowa Kultura*, of March 3, 1955). "We talk about him as a great leader and politician, and we are doing the wrong thing. Mickiewicz was not a good politician. He was a great political poet, he was a magnificent poet-moralist. Youth suspects us sometimes of insincerity, because we hide from them the truth about Mickiewicz. And to some extent they are right. What is usually done in order to comfortably pass over the difficulties provoked by a great number of contradictions and inconsequentialities in the political and journalistic activities of the poet? We cut passages of the text."

On the drama, *The Forefathers' Eve*, Jastrun says, "I see no reason to hide the fact that we are dealing here with a mystery play, nor to keep silent over the fact that *The Forefathers' Eve*, in spite of its character as a political pamphlet, is a drama open to many interpretations, a drama which throughout the centuries will assume, for each epoch, a different meaning."

He adds, later, "George Sand put this work above the writings of the Prophets, above *Manfred* and *Faust*, but she argued against its Catholicism. We do not discuss this—we simply pass it by. This is no way out of the difficulty."

Of Mickiewicz's renunciation of poetry, Jastrun says: "At a given moment of his life, Mickiewicz rejected poetry, not to fly off to a desert like Rimbaud, but to take a more active part in history. He stopped writing, and it could not have been otherwise, because he put to poetry exigencies of such a moral asceticism that no art could bear so great a stress." Jastrun, the author of a valuable book on Mickiewicz, is not alone in his pronouncement. I quote him because he is the most courageous. The end result of the quarrel

between the poets who always try to preserve "feeling and faith" and the Polish Academy of Science is foreseeable. Its victory, however, will be only a superficial one, as always when the truth is defeated.

To put a brake on the popularity of Mickiewicz is impossible. It would mean abolishing the thesis that the "socialist nation" is the inheritor of all the past. Polish poetry is like a building whose foundations were laid in the sixteenth century when the Reformation fostered the development of literary language; it was Mickiewicz who erected the main walls. A country that today numbers around thirty million inhabitants, with the immense human reservoir of the populations of Eurasia as its neighbor, looks for refuge between those walls, a refuge not of brick or of stone but of the poetic word. This close interplay of literature and life, unknown to the same extent, anywhere in the West, is full of potentialities as well as of dangers.

The Shock-Battalions of 1917*

Reminiscences

BY VICTOR MANAKIN

AT one o'clock in the morning of November 18 (New Style), the last group of shock-troopers left *Stavka*. Krylenko was waiting to be notified of this, but not, of course, out of considerations of honor. He arrived in Mogilev, as we found out later, at six o'clock in the morning, with six squads of sailors from the Baltic fleet. General Dukhonin was summoned to the railroad station "in order to hand over his command" and was bayoneted by the "guard" of the new Commander-in-Chief.

At four o'clock in the morning, our troop-trains arrived before Zhlobin. The railroad-yard was jammed full of trains carrying deserters to their homes. This was a peculiar method for demobilizing the Russian army at that time. I went to the railroad station with two scouts in order to find out when we would be able to move on. The station was crammed full of deserters. In unbuttoned overcoats, with a dirty, dishevelled appearance, they presented a frightful spectacle of the seamy side of the Revolution.

Bleysh's shock-troopers were not there, for the battalion had left for the branch line to Minsk, where it was fighting two armored trains which had been sent to cut us off. I went through the crowd to the Commandant's quarters. My officer's epaulettes and shock-trooper insignia produced their effect. The crowd made way for me.

The Commandant was in the throes of confusion. We went out into another room. In a trembling voice he told me that the bridge across the Dnieper had been prepared for demolition, and that a Bolshevik division with artillery was waiting for us on the other bank. What alertness after the coincident confusion of their Commander-in-Chief!

The Commandant advised me to take a detour by way of the still open branch line to Kalinkovichi. While we were talking, the room was filling up with deserters. All of them were looking at me with interest. The crowd was unarmed. Two men came in with rifles. One asked me, "And who might you be?"

*This is the second of two installments of the author's reminiscences of the Russian front in April-December 1917 [Ed.].

"The commanding officer of the shock-regiment," I replied. The soldier stepped back. I went out onto the platform.

At the exit stood a dense mob of soldiers, who were waiting for me to come out. I took two steps and was hemmed in. They grabbed me and tore away my revolver. I broke loose and took a few more steps. Near me stood Zorkin, my scout, secretary of the regimental committee. He addressed the mob. Someone struck him on the head from behind. He fell.

I tried to walk on, but the mob became thicker and would not give way. In front of me stood men with dull eyes, such as one finds in murderers and Bolsheviks. I started to talk to the crowd. Suddenly it was as though I had become the chairman of a meeting. The question under discussion was whether to kill me on the spot or to wait. Those standing in front of me kept their eyes lowered, as though they wanted to say, "We have nothing to do with this!"

From in back, men were shouting, "Kill him!"

I said, "It won't do you any good to kill me. My shock-troopers will come and kill all of you. You'll be better off if you keep me as a hostage. Then my shock-troopers will do anything you want."

At this point my glance met the eyes of my second scout. He was asking me what to do. I motioned to him with my head to go get help. He understood and disappeared. I remained alone in the midst of the maddened mob. Undoubtedly there were many among them who had taken part in murdering officers. But no one could make up his mind to take the first step. My rank as commanding officer of the shock-troopers impressed them. From the rear, the yells kept getting stronger and stronger, "Kill him!"

I had to stall for time. I started to speak of our striving to save the honor of our Fatherland, of our country. It was impossible to kill me at this moment. Those standing close by began to back away, and from behind, the yells were growing louder and louder. A circle was cleared around me. I realized that the most important thing was for me to remain on my feet. At this point I was struck on the head by something thrown from the rear ranks. I turned around. The men were still standing with their eyes lowered. No one could bring himself to strike me in the face. They began to push me around in the circle from one edge to the other. I was clearly aware of the fact that if I should fall, they would trample me to death. A fallen enemy is no longer frightening.

Psychologically, I still had the upper hand over the mob, but I realized clearly that the situation could not continue this way for

long. My strength was giving out. A little longer, and I would fall and then the affair would be finished.

With this feeling, I closed my eyes. I had no desire to see the act of murder itself. I was ready for death. I no longer saw or heard anything. In my brain was a sensation of blankness. In my eyes appeared two fiery wheels which rotated rapidly as they came near. Fire filled everything. I was sure that this was death itself, the moment of transition into a better world.

I suddenly wanted to verify this, and with a final exertion of will, I opened my eyes. I was alive, . . . and I was alone. The mob had disappeared. I was standing on the platform, and men were crawling under the cars of a train which was standing there. They were lying on top of one another. I saw only feet, many feet, in military boots. . . .

I heard a few shots, and I understood. My shock-troopers had come to the rescue of their commanding officer! I walked in the direction of the shots. At the end of the station I saw my scouts running up with carbines in their hands. They were breathless from running. It was almost a mile from the troop-train to the station. Second Lieutenant Marinkovic, a Serb, and my detail commander, came running up to me. "You're alive, Colonel. Well, thank God! Get away. We'll take care of things here ourselves."

He ran on. Two scouts took me by the arm and led me away. In the train, I was able only to tell Yankevsky to go to Kalinkovichi and then I lost consciousness. My skull had been severely wounded, and I had lost a great deal of blood.

I did not regain consciousness until thirty-six hours later, when our troop-trains had successfully gone around Gomel and were already beyond Bakhmakh. In the door of the compartment, Marinkovic was showing me the faces of the most suspicious of the deserters, whom he had arrested. It was, of course, impossible for me to identify who of the mob might have struck me. I ordered that they all be released.

At the way stations, the local Communists kept trying to detain us by not giving us any locomotives. We took them by force. At one station we were warned that the road was mined. I ordered that the chairman of the local Soviet be taken along and placed in our locomotive, with the warning that if any explosion occurred in his sector, he would be the first to be killed. After that, I gave him ten minutes to make arrangements with his subordinates. Nothing happened to us along the way.

At one of the following stations, an armored train came out towards our leading train and, drawing right up to it, fired a gun at our locomotive, exploding the boiler. The armored train then moved back two miles. I suggested to Bleysh that he go around the armored train and tear up the tracks, and I myself went along the roadbed of the railroad with only half a company. When we had come up to within a quarter of a mile of the armored train, it began to fire its guns at us. We continued to approach without shooting. When we were only one hundred paces away, several sailors jumped out ("the ornament and pride of the Revolution," as they were then called). They had come out in order to give battle on even terms. This was a peculiar kind of chivalry characteristic of sailors. We opened fire, and several men fell. The rest took cover in the train and defended themselves by firing their machine-guns. At this point, they noticed Bleysh's column which was going around them, and the armored train withdrew.

As we were approaching Belgorod, northeast of Kharkov, in the Ukraine, we were informed that there was more than a division of Reds there and that preparations had been made to blow up the bridge in front of the city. I proposed that the city be attacked that same night and I went on ahead with a battalion in order to seize the bridge. Captain Blinov, dressed in civilian clothes, rode out first on a sledge, in order to reconnoiter. Unfortunately, it turned out that the bridge had already been blown up. Our road was cut off. Yankevsky, together with the Finnish battalion, caught up with me and said that they had decided to leave the train and continue on to the Don in marching formation. This was not in keeping with the spirit of the shock-troopers. At the very moment that we dropped the initiative, we would lose our chief advantage, the element of being on the offensive.

This was the critical moment in our operations, but I had to submit in order not to split up our forces. This was the price I had to pay for my mistake in inviting into our detachment a front-line battalion which was not so staunch in spirit as our battalions, and for the cardinal error of giving the command to another person. There was nothing else we could do. We retreated.

At the Oboyan station our detachment left the trains and proceeded to march. We were beginning the Civil War. Before starting out, I assembled the battalion. Inasmuch as the volunteers had entered the battalion for the sake of defending our homeland from a foreign enemy and not for the purpose of fighting a civil war, and

since, in leaving the trains, we were directly confronted by a Civil War in fact, I did not feel that I had the right to lead the men into battle without warning them and without having their consent to do so.

What could I say to the volunteers in this new situation? I never said anything of which I myself was not certain. They had grown used to trusting me, for they saw that I was completely frank with them, that I was not just their superior officer but also their older brother, who had a better grasp of the situation and who desired the very best both for our country and for the volunteers. I told the battalion openly that I myself did not understand a thing any more; that I saw that Russia was perishing, that it had already been completely engulfed by Communism with its amoral doctrines based on deceit and on the exploitation of the lowest instincts of the masses. I said that I had no facts to go on as to whether anyone else was still fighting against this power of darkness and violence, but that I felt that I did not dare surrender and submit, for my own honor did not allow me to do so, nor did my duty to my country in this time of disaster.

I added that I did not want to deceive anyone. In this struggle we had almost no chance whatsoever. We could not win. Before us was a ninety-eight percent probability of death and only a two percent possibility of remaining alive. But was life worthwhile in the bondage of violence? I also said that I had decided to fight to the very end. Death would be better than the shame of humiliation. But I did not feel that I had the right to issue any orders about this. Every man had to decide for himself. "Whoever is going with me," I said, "three steps forward!" And at that instant, the whole battalion, as one man, took three steps forward. This was a moment of such a lofty height of nobility, loyalty, and self-sacrifice, that the tears came even to my eyes, me, the commanding officer of these men. But I was not ashamed of those tears. And I was proud of my men. It was a moment of complete spiritual union of the unit and its commanding officer. I thanked the shock-troopers and gave orders. My volunteers of their own accord were taking responsibility for the future upon themselves.

We moved off in marching order. My battalion was in the advance guard. In the very first village, an interesting psychological incident occurred. When the peasant women saw the shock-troopers, they said, "Why, darlings, you're just like our children, like our own little sonny boys. And the Bolsheviks were telling us that you're

'Cadets' [Members of the Constitutional Democratic Party] and that you have one eye in your foreheads and that you eat peasant children alive. It's too horrible to talk about!"

Only then did we understand why the peasants had been looking at us in such a hostile manner and why they had been shooting at us occasionally from around corners. The only way it had been possible for us to enter a village was with our rifles in our hands. The Bolsheviks were making use of the ignorance of the village masses and were inciting the peasants against us by tales which were extremely stupid but had an effect on the imagination.

After marching for two more days, we stopped in a large village. There were three hundred of us, and the main forces were five miles behind us. All around, everything was peaceful, and I started to believe that our march would end happily. We did not even set up any forward outpost.

Suddenly, at eleven o'clock in the morning, Lieutenant Nacewicz, a former officer in the Polish Legion, came running up to me and reported that sailors were advancing upon the village. This was so unlikely in the backwoods of Kursk Province that I said, "Sailors? It can't be! Check up on it!" and I continued to give orders with regard to our messing and billeting facilities.

A few minutes later, Nacewicz returned and reported that sailors really were surrounding the village and had already entered it in part. I ran out into the street. There was no longer any time to give orders. I shouted down the length of the village, "Everybody out to the borders of the village with your rifles in your hands! Pass the word along!"

The shock-troopers rushed to the edge of the village right through the kitchen-gardens. I took my carbine and went there too. Suddenly someone pulled me back and I saw that it was my orderly, Andreev, who had tended my horse throughout the whole war. When I took over the regiment, he had gone along with me, since he did not want to leave me after the Revolution. At first I did not understand what it was all about, but when I heard the whistle of bullets, it became clear to me that Andreev had gone ahead of me in order to shield me from the bullets with his own body.

We went out to a small hill, where my scouts had already gone. Along the entire horizon, as far as the eye could see, over the snow-covered fields, sailors, wearing black overcoats, were advancing in three lines. There were several battalions of them. The first line was firing. It was our hill in particular that the fire was concen-

trated upon. The flanks were already entering the village. Near me was Lieutenant Maksimov, a man with populist sympathies, who had always dreamed of revolution. Now his attitude had changed. He set up his machine-gun on a windmill and opened fire. Other machine-guns appeared on the neighboring windmills and the lines of the enemy began to stop and suffer casualties. Against the white background of the snow, it was clearly visible that black spots remained on the snow. To the right and to the left I saw shock-troopers occupying the outskirts of the village. Along the entire line intense rifle and machine-gun fire was going on.

Near me, Zorkin, who had been with me in Zhlobin, was killed by a bullet through his head. My best shock-trooper had given his life for the defense of our country. At this time, I saw Lieutenant Marinkovic coming towards me from the skirmish line. A bullet had pierced his head through the eye, the eye had fallen out and was hanging on his chest by a nerve fiber. Catching sight of me, Marinkovic cried out, "What are you doing here? You're supposed to be commanding the regiment, not standing here in the skirmish line. We'll take care of things here ourselves."

And with that, he wound the eye up in his hand, tore it off, and tossed it on the ground. Two scouts ran up to him to carry him back to the rear, but he screamed at them, "It's not necessary. I'll get there by myself. Go to the fighting line! They need you more over there!" Honor and glory to this hero, this Serbian officer, who by his personal bravery, engraved a debt of honor to himself in the ranks of the shock-troopers of a kindred nation. His wound was mortal.

The battle kept growing hotter along the entire front. The lines of sailors came up to within two hundred paces of our lines. Matters were coming to a head. At this point, Lieutenant Nacewicz came running up to me again and reported, "A delegation of sailors is coming!" I saw that a group of sailors with rifles in their hands really was moving along our front line, from the left. Of course this was not a delegation at all. Nevertheless, I called them over to me. They came near. They were fifteen Goliaths, sailors of the Black Sea Fleet.

They were looking for the commanding officer. They could easily have killed me and thus produced chaos in our ranks. But they came up with a seemingly pacific manner. I asked, "Who are you?" They said that they had been sent up from the Black Sea specifically to fight against the shock-troopers. That meant that

this was a large-scale operation, on orders from Leningrad. They asked, "And what are you fighting for?"

"For our people and for the future of our country," I said.

"We are too," they replied. (This was an extremely characteristic type of incident at the beginning of the Civil War.)

I asked, "Then why are you advancing against us?"

"Well, the commissars told us that you are 'Cadets' and that we could take you with our bare hands. But what a fight you're putting up! Look how many of our men have been killed!"

"There'll be more if you don't stop," I replied.

"Well why should we keep on fighting? Cease fire!"

"You stop first," I said.

They started to signal, sailor-fashion, "Cease fire!" In a few minutes, the firing actually stopped. I then ordered our men to cease fire. The situation was becoming extremely uncertain. What was to be done next? If the sailors intermingled with us, we would be lost.

I shouted over to the enemy line, "Halt! You can come near at the rate of one man to a company, and without any weapons!" At once five sailors stood up from the lines opposite me and advanced towards us with rifles. I gave an order for my men to open up machine-gun fire. All five fell. I called out, "Only one man to a company and without any weapons! Do you understand?"

And from the line came the answer, "We understand." One sailor came out, unarmed. I asked my men, "Who wants to go have a friendly chat with him?" One shock-trooper went out.

The two men met between our lines. A wholly improbable incident followed. They turned out to be brothers. The shock-trooper was the older one. The sailor said, "Are you Vanyukha? What are you doing here?"

"I know what I'm doing here," replied the shock-trooper, "but what are you doing here? Whom are you fighting against? Against your own brother!"

"But the commissars sent us,—they say you're Cadets."

"Well, you can see what kind of Cadets we are. As for you men, you just keep on listening to your commissars, and they'll soon be ordering you to kill your parents too!"

The sailor threw his cap down on the ground and said, "I'm with you too! Let me join up with you as a shock-trooper!"

Both of them came up to me and I said, "If the company committee accepts you, I have nothing against it."

This incident was instantaneously relayed throughout all the lines, both ours and the sailors'. It had a powerful psychological impact upon the sailors. Their sympathies began clearly to veer towards our side. But the situation was still dangerous.

At this point, I saw that one sailor with a rifle was running over to us from the sailors' rear lines. I said, "Let him through." He ran up panting, with his collar unbuttoned. His first words were, "Where's the commanding officer?"

I raised my hand. "I'm the commanding officer. What's the matter?"

"Well, I've been the orderly of our commanding officer, a midshipman, and, well, he was killed the very first thing, by one shot from a machine-gun. Our men are waiting for orders. What shall I tell them?"

The matter became clear to me. For him, the important thing was the job for which he was responsible, namely to transmit orders. What kind of orders did not matter. His commanding officer had been killed. He was looking for another commanding officer. I gave the following order: "All of the lines of sailors are to start immediate withdrawal back to where they came from. They are to fall back in order, without bunching up. I'm giving them thirty minutes. Whoever does not fall back will be killed! Understand?"

"Aye aye, sir," answered the sailor and ran off to transmit the order along the lines. A few minutes later, the nearest lines began to withdraw.

The "delegation" of sailors was stunned by all that they had seen. They at once suggested sending some delegates from our side to their commissars in order to put a stop to military operations as being totally unnecessary. I said, "And who guarantees that your commissars won't kill our delegates?"

"We guarantee it," they replied, and then they proposed that half of their own men be kept as hostages, so that the other half could be a guard for our delegates. "If," they added, "your delegates don't return by five o'clock in the morning, you can shoot our men whom you'll be holding as hostages."

I asked the shock-troopers, "Who wants to go along as a delegate on these terms?" Captain Blinov and Cadet Tikhonov volunteered. They went off with eight sailors, and seven remained as hostages.

We returned to the village. There we found about thirty more sailors. They were trembling with cold and asked to be allowed to warm up and they also requested something to eat. We arrested

them and sent them back to the rear. I sent a report to Yankevsky and asked for reinforcements. We went to sleep. Thus ended our first battle with the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet—three hundred against five thousand.

At five o'clock in the morning, our delegates returned. They related that when they had driven up, crowds of sailors had gathered around to talk to them, to look at them. But the commissar forbade them to do so! He was not sure of his own sailors! Our "delegates" were taken to headquarters, where a whole group of commissars was discussing what to do. One suggested putting our delegates on a stove and roasting them a little, as an example. But when the chief commissar ordered our delegates to be seized, the sailor escort aimed their guns and declared they would kill anyone who came near. The commissars backed down. After that, negotiations were started. The commissars proposed a "truce" and suggested that our delegates be sent to the regional committee. Our delegates asked, "What guarantees do you give? None? Then there'll be no truce!" And they left. I had not expected anything different, but this was an interesting experience for the shock-troopers.

In the morning, Bleysh arrived with two companies. He told me that there was confusion in the main body of troops. They had been informed that we had been surrounded and defeated and that I had been killed. General Yankevsky had decided to withdraw. We were ordered to fall back. This was actually the most ridiculous thing to do, in view of the situation as it had developed. Instead of pushing our success further, we ourselves were acknowledging defeat. The reason was that Yankevsky was under the influence of Bakhtin and of his battalion, which did not belong to our formation and was unsuited for civil war. I was once again compelled to submit.

Subsequently, I found out that the entire detachment of sailors of the Black Sea Fleet had refused to obey their commissars, had refused to fight against us, and, taking their dead and wounded, had ridden off to Sevastopol. After a solemn funeral in Sevastopol for the victims of the Revolution, a massacre of the officers started. Weights were tied to their feet and they were thrown alive into the sea, right from the pier. Two years later, divers in the Crimea, who were with Wrangel, found a large number of remains at the bottom of the sea, still bound in their chains. These men had been Russian officers whose only guilt lay in the fact that they had believed in the possibility of life under the Communists.

This battle, which took place near Krapivna, was our swan song. Instead of pushing through to the east, to the Don, through the demoralized ranks of the adversary, General Yankevsky and Bakhtin had decided to retreat. Where could we retreat to? All of Russia was already a seething cauldron in the hands of the Bolsheviks. But Bleysh and I carried out our orders once more and went off to join the rest of the battalions. When we arrived at the designated point, there was no one there. At the same time, we were informed that instead of the demoralized battalions of sailors from the Black Sea Fleet, newly arrived units of sailors from the Baltic Fleet, with cavalry and artillery, had been sent out against us. At the very first clash, the Finnish battalion had been defeated, and the survivors, together with Colonel Bakhtin and General Yankevsky, had fled without waiting for us. We turned out to be in the rear-guard.

The agonized retreat of our detachment began. The men walked through the snow, frequently without any boots. We moved at night, and in the daytime, we fought. The sailors even had tanks. The battle was becoming an uneven match. Day and night we were under artillery fire and we sustained heavy losses. Many men could not walk any more. The sailors were finishing off the survivors. There were no vehicles with which to remove our wounded. It was clear that we no longer had any strength to continue the battle. We had to reach a decision.

I assembled all the officers and members of our battalion committees, who were still alive, and opened the last meeting of the shock-troopers. I said, "Dear friends! We engaged in this struggle in the name of a feeling of duty to our Fatherland in the hour of its ruin. We fought as well as we could, so as not to lose our own self-respect. No one laid down his arms. Most of our friends have perished in an unevenly matched battle. Our ranks have grown thin. Our survivors and wounded are being killed off. I feel that we have fulfilled our duty to our own consciences. Further opposition will lead only to the destruction of each and every one of us. I propose that we stop fighting and disperse."

Thereupon, Cadet Tikhonov, the vice-chairman of the regimental committee, stood up and said, "Colonel, sir, we've been thinking about that for a long time, but we didn't want to say anything to you, because we didn't want to distress you. We've been waiting for you to bring the matter up yourself. Now you've spoken up. It's all clear. We agree. There's nothing else for us to do."

I removed the regimental banner from its staff and gave it to a

sergeant-major from Siberia. He kneeled. I made the sign of the cross over him and said, "I am giving you this banner of our shock-regiment. Shock-troopers have died under it, sons of the Russian people, for the honor of their country. Hide it in your bosom, and if the Lord destines you to live to brighter days, when the shame of our native land will be wiped out, give this banner to the new national government of Russia and tell them about us, about our struggle, the struggle of our nation's sons, and about our destruction for the sake of its honor." He kissed the banner and hid it in his breast. This was a moment of the highest spiritual intensity and fervor.

After that, Tikhonov, in the name of the whole committee, turned to me and said, "Have you said everything you wanted to say, colonel, sir?"

"Yes, I've said everything I thought necessary in the name of our great ideal and of our sacrifices."

"Now the time has come for us, your volunteers, to have our say. May I speak?"

I did not understand right away what there could still be for him to say. It seemed as though everything had been said, that there was nothing to add. So, in surprise, I said, "Go ahead!" And he spoke. He said something that none of the officers had expected. At first, he asked a question, "I turn to you, our commanders and officers. I speak in the name of the last survivors of the shock-troopers, I speak in the name of those who have perished. I speak in this hour of our final leave-taking. We shall probably never see each other again. Tell us, have we shock-troopers carried out all your orders? Are you satisfied with us? Was there ever so much as one single instance of insubordination or cowardice?"

All of us officers answered together, "No, there never was."

"Can we feel that we rank-and-file shock-troopers have fulfilled our duty to our country to the very end?"

"Yes, you can!" we answered. We still did not understand what he was driving at.

"Well, then, I must inform you, officers and gentlemen, of the last thing that we shock-troopers want from you, our officers, before our final separation. If the sailors capture us, they may shoot us, or then again they may not! But if they capture you, our officers, they will shoot you for certain! Therefore, we volunteers in this final moment *demand* of you, our officers, that you leave this village *first*, just as you always went in front of us in all difficult moments.

And we demand that you leave this very night, in enlisted men's uniforms, and each one of you take along whomever of us he wants to, and fight his way out the best he can and go wherever he wants to go. We volunteers have decided to remain here till morning in order to cover the departure of you officers so that your dispersal won't be noticeable! Farewell, commanders and officers! We want you to keep the same memory of us that we have of you! I am finished!"

With this act, the final page was written in the history of the shock-battalions.

On the Don at this time, the formation of a Volunteer Army was begun, under the command of General Alekseev, former Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, and of General Kornilov, who had fled at that time from Bykhov. The shock-troopers who had succeeded in making their way through together with me entered this army.

Peter Mogila—Metropolitan of Kiev

BY HUGH F. GRAHAM

RUSSIA has owed much to the Orthodox Church; the Church, in turn, has owed its influence to the zeal and abilities of its ministers. One of the greatest of these was Peter Mogila (1596-1647), Metropolitan of Kiev during the last years of Polish rule.

Kiev had witnessed bitter religious struggles. The West Russian Church, even after coming under Polish rule, had continued to give allegiance to the Orthodox Church of Moscow. To weaken this allegiance, the Catholic government of Poland had created a position of Metropolitan of the West Russian Church in Kiev, in the hope that the incumbent would prove to be less under Muscovite and more under Polish influence.

A century of political discrimination against its members had weakened, though failed to destroy, the Orthodox Church; but a policy of open persecution had caused some of its adherents to go over to the Uniate Church, an institution of compromise, that permitted marriage of the clergy and worship in the native language with Eastern rites, but acknowledged the hegemony of the Pope at Rome. The Polish government gave increasing support to the Uniate Church: in 1596 a Synod was held at Brest-Litovsk which extended official recognition and gave to the Uniate Church a complete hierarchical structure headed by a Metropolitan.

At this time, when the fortunes of the Orthodox Church were low, by the example of his leadership, Mogila restored much of the Church's strength. By the College that he founded he first enabled the Orthodox clergy to challenge the Jesuits (who had been invited to Poland), in their own sphere, education, and by the church books published under his supervision he went far to restore the purity of Orthodox ritual.

A diplomat who could make good use of his influence at the Polish court, but a man of violence on occasion, Mogila was tireless in the solicitation of money and support for the cause to which he devoted his entire personal fortune. He was a man of learning, vision, and piety, fully aware of, and able to cope with, the temporal needs of his congregations. When, shortly after his death, the South-West Russian lands came under the control of the Tsars, the legacy he left bore rich fruit under the rapidly expanding Muscovite empire.

It is hoped that this short account of Mogila's career will assist Western readers to an appreciation of this important but little-known historical figure.

A son of Ivan Mogila, a nobleman of strong Orthodox views who had settled in Kiev, Peter was born in 1596, the year of the Synod of Brest-Litovsk, and his youth was spent during the first part of the seventeenth century, when the Uniate Metropolitan adopted a policy of violence, attacking and overthrowing centers of Orthodox worship. After receiving an unusually thorough education, first at the staunchly Orthodox Lvov Brotherhood¹ School, later at Polish Catholic institutions, and perhaps at the Sorbonne and Oxford, Mogila served for a time in the Polish army.

He soon abandoned a secular life, and in 1624 he entered the Pechersky Monastery at Kiev, where he served for two years as a Novitiate. Upon the death of the Archimandrite, or Abbot, of that institution in 1626, Mogila was already a strong contender for the position. Although the members of the monastery disputed the succession for two years, he surmounted all opposition and was consecrated Archimandrite in 1628.

It was impossible for a representative of the Orthodox faith to maintain his position by peaceful means, since the Uniate Church and the Polish government had not scrupled to adopt violent measures. In 1624 Pope Urban VIII, hearing of the stubborn Orthodox zeal displayed by the Zaporogian Cossacks, called upon the Polish king himself to check them: ". . . Arise, O King, most illustrious destroyer of Turks, you who loathe all impiety. Take up arms, and, should the public weal demand it, strike down this poisonous serpent with fire and sword."²

Thus it is scarcely surprising to read a complaint from the Uniate Metropolitan to the effect that Mogila had armed approximately one thousand monastery peasants, secured the services of some Zaporogian Cossacks to command them, and ordered the entire force into the lands of the Uniate Monastery of St. Zasimov. Upon their arrival they erected gallows to terrify the inhabitants and laid siege to the monastery village for an entire week. After carrying

¹The Brotherhoods were devoutly Orthodox town groups organized for mutual assistance, occupying a position in which both religious and secular elements were blended.

²*Supplementum ad Historica Russiae Monumenta*, St. Petersburg, 1848, pp. 480-481.

off some of the corn from the monastery fields and destroying the rest, they cut down many trees and plundered the local peasants.³

One of the most important events in Mogila's life, which became a turning-point in his career, was his journey to Warsaw early in 1632 as an Orthodox representative to the Assembly summoned at the death of Sigismund III to choose the new Polish king.

It is not clear to what extent Mogila participated in the negotiations, but at their conclusion the new king, Vladislav IV, who enjoyed a reputation of greater sympathy to the Orthodox Church than his father had, made certain concessions to secure Orthodox support.

Although these concessions were substantial, Mogila, realizing that the moment was propitious for making further demands, conducted a vigorous campaign among the Orthodox. A letter written at the time revealed his appreciation of the need for tact in soliciting the support of the Orthodox nobility:

In very truth the hour has come for us who have been wronged to answer the call and to obtain what in justice belongs to us. God Himself is on the side of the cause of justice, and justice sides with us. We need only agreement and unity. We are already acting in concert with all members of the *Szlachta*, but further we ask for your wise advice and assistance.⁴

Mogila's campaign was successful, for in a second assembly held on the first of November of the same year, the king permitted further concessions to the Orthodox.

Mogila secured a personal triumph at this assembly. As Archimandrite of the Pechersky Monastery he was subordinate to the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Isaiah Kopinsky, the man who had chosen him as delegate to the assembly, but Mogila contrived his own immediate appointment to that office by the new king, who doubtless thought that Mogila's connections among the Polish noble families and his education in Polish schools would make him more favorable to Polish interests. Since Kopinsky would be unwilling to consecrate Mogila in his own place, the ceremony was performed in April, 1633, in Lvov by Volotsky, Archbishop of the Uspensky Cathedral, acting in the name of the higher authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Even before officially consecrated, Mogila had vested in himself all the titles of his new office in an

³ *Archiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, Kiev, 1883, Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 618-620.

⁴ I. I. Malushevsky, *Zapadnaja Rus v borbe za very i narodnosti*, Moscow, 1905, Vol. II, p. 103.

invitation extended to the Lutsk Brotherhood to attend his consecration.⁵

After the ceremony Mogila returned to Kiev, and his entrance resembled a triumphal procession. Hailing him victor in the struggle with the Poles, the clergy and Brotherhoods greeted him with a panegyric through which runs a note of real sincerity:

By your support, exertions, and watchfulness, you have brought tranquillity to the Russian Ocean, agitated as it has been during the course of centuries. You have upheld, more clearly than the noonday sun, the rights of the Orthodox Church, hard as a jewel in its strength, golden in its value, and sacred in its ancientness. Having revealed the injustice which has weighed upon us for so many years, you have utterly destroyed it before God's anointed sovereign. Now be pleased to go to Vilno and to the other towns of the Lithuanian state and see with what joy you are greeted there by those who formerly filled the jails and dungeons for holding to the Orthodox Faith.⁶

A different view of Mogila's activities was given by Erlich, a contemporary member of the Orthodox petty nobility, who wrote:

After he (Mogila) returned to Kiev, in order to secure control of the Metropolitan estates he deprived Kopinsky of his office, and, dismissing the clergy whom the latter had appointed, drove the old man out of the Mikhailovsky Monastery with but one hair shirt. Kopinsky was obliged to end his days in great poverty.⁷

One important point should be borne in mind before calling Mogila's assumption of the office of Metropolitan a usurpation. The king's rescript of 1632 gave official sanction to his new position, and by the agreement of the same year the Orthodox people secured the right of electing their own Metropolitan under terms that implied cancellation of any conditions existing prior to that time. As soon as the Orthodox representatives learned of the new agreement they proclaimed: "Let us elect those whom the Lord God Himself has shown to our hearts as men who unite in themselves illustrious origin, high ideals, distinguished piety, and great wisdom, with an unwavering devotion to the Orthodox Church."⁸

It is difficult not to think that they were referring to Mogila; thus, it is highly probable that the delegates, interpreting the new concessions as their first legal authority, at once availed themselves

⁵*Pamiatniki izdannye vremenoj kommisiei dlja razbora drevnikh aktov*, Kiev, 1845, Vol. I, pp. 135-138.

⁶Malushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁷Quoted in S. M. Solovev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, St. Petersburg, 1894-95, Vol. X, Chap. 1, Col. 1488.

⁸Malushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

of the opportunity of choosing the young and energetic Mogila as Metropolitan in place of the aged and ailing Kopinsky.

The Orthodox population unquestionably regarded Mogila as the new Metropolitan, and he took his mandate and responsibilities seriously. Under his auspices a new Brotherhood was founded at Pinsk, complete with a hospital, and a school that gave instruction in the Greek, Latin, Russian, and Polish languages; in 1634, in Mogilev, construction was undertaken on a church, whose founding had been successfully opposed by the Uniates for over forty years. In Kiev his leadership was asserted even more strikingly; the period 1633-44 saw the complete restoration and renovation of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, which had formerly been held by the Uniates, as well as substantial repairs to the Pechersky Monastery, and the churches of St. Vladimir and St. Basil. From time to time Mogila sent letters and undertook journeys to the churches and Brotherhoods, everywhere urging the Orthodox to stand firm in defence of the faith, and by his example spurring his subordinates to greater efforts. His first concern was to revive the spirit of the Orthodox monasteries, which, under Uniate persecution had lost much of their influence and had become unorthodox in their ritual. With irony and a certain grim humor he remarked of the Cypralsky Monastery in Lithuania: ". . . A fine exchange they have made with God; in place of silver they offer Him painted cloth."⁹

Mogila was constantly pressed for money to aid his campaigns against the opposition and his ambitious program of church restoration. Many of his letters were filled with appeals for funds from Orthodox supporters.¹⁰ But in spite of such appeals, financial problems remained pressing throughout Mogila's entire tenure of office. He was obliged to write to the Minsk Brotherhood in 1640:

In view of new persecutions of the Orthodox Church I have prepared to proceed to the assembly and am ready to expend every ounce of my strength in your service if you will support me. It is not unknown to you how I labored in former assemblies for the needs of the church and how I spent money in that cause. All the treasures of my forefathers, the Hospodars, have been expended upon it; I have left neither gold nor silver nor ancestral jewels. The monasterial estates were all exhausted during the time of the recent wars and invasions of the Tartars. I urge you to form a "Contribution Club" and send aid to me in Warsaw. Without support from you, as soon as I appeared in Warsaw I should be obliged to turn back again with nothing accomplished. I promise to procure alleviation for us all.¹¹

⁹Malushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹¹Malushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

His need for funds drove Mogila to attack his supporters. In 1636 the Orthodox Brotherhood of the Kievo-Nikolsky Monastery complained that Mogila had driven out the monks and deposed the Abbott with the help of the Zaporogian Cossacks.¹² In connection with Mogila's activities on this occasion the account of Erlich contains supplementary information:

Because of his need for money, Mogila fell on the Nikolsky Monastery with armed bands and cannons. He drove out the Abbott and ordered the monks beaten with whips until they revealed the hiding place of their silver. Driven out of their monastery, some of these monks became Uniates, while others wandered about the country without refuge.¹³

Nevertheless, from whatever source his financial support came, Mogila revitalized Orthodox institutions: they kept what they already held, and they built new churches, monasteries, schools, and alms-houses.

These efforts to unify and strengthen the Orthodox Church provoked strong opposition. The Uniates made representations to the Polish government of the danger of an Orthodox revival, and Mogila had to attend an assembly called to investigate the matter. The defence made by each side met with results not entirely satisfactory to either, while the government revealed that political expediency was still its dominant consideration. Although the king upheld the greater measure of independence allowed the Orthodox Church, still terming it "Schismatic" he forbade the establishment of churches in certain towns despite their substantial Orthodox populations.

Opposition to the Orthodox Church also had its practical side, shown in the attitude of Polish officials stationed in Orthodox towns. In Kiev Mogila was unfortunate in having a Military Governor who was a zealous Polonizer and a Catholic. He persecuted the students of Mogila's church school, as a letter from Mogila to the Minsk Brotherhood in 1640 eloquently testifies:

I am enduring every kind of persecution from the Military Governor. In Kiev he has recently begun to commit overt acts of violence against us and to shed blood. Annoyed by the fact that in my College are being taught many young Russian men, and fearing that these youths, having learned science, would be able to show the truth to the whole world and mightily defend the Sacred Church, the Governor ordered his resident Viceroy to frame a serious charge against one of the students, so that the others, becoming frightened, would all

¹² *Arkhiv, op. cit.*, pp. 726-727.

¹³ Solovev, *op. cit.*, Col. 1489.

hasten back to the various schools in which they formerly studied. Behold!—during the first week of Lent, when a student, Fedor Gogolevsky, was going through the square, he was seized and locked up. Then a servant of the Viceroy, Sepach, testified that one night when he and his friends were in a tavern, the students made an attack on it and wounded somebody. The Viceroy, instead of setting an inquiry on foot, ordered the student to be immediately beheaded. This happened during my absence from Kiev.¹⁴

Although head of the Orthodox Church in Kiev, Mogila always acknowledged himself subordinate to the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople. His attitude was based on sound reasoning. By openly acknowledging Constantinople, he actually enjoyed a greater measure of independence than he could otherwise have possessed, since he thus maintained his position as Metropolitan of Kiev, delicately balanced between Uniates and Catholics on one side and the growing power of the Patriarch of Moscow on the other. The Patriarch of Constantinople was the most remote and the most beset by internal problems; thus, the one least likely to interfere at Kiev.

In 1636 the Polish king held an assembly to study the possibility of unification of the Uniate and Orthodox Churches. The Uniates thought to offer the position of Metropolitan of such a unified church to Mogila, believing that they could thus secure more control over him. The Chronicle of the Lvov Brotherhood for that year commented on Mogila's reaction to the proposal in unflattering terms:

The King's project, devised for the deception and seduction of the Church, was not brought to accomplishment, although the Metropolitan was inclined to it. He, without doubt, imagined that no other than himself would be chosen because of his illustrious ancestry.¹⁵

The Brotherhood, probably annoyed by the censorship which Mogila was imposing on their publication of church books,¹⁶ was attributing to him intentions that he never had. It seems more likely that Mogila, overcoming temptation, recognized that the proposed office would place him in a position of subservience to both Polish government and Uniate clergy. The fact that the conference accomplished nothing is further substantiation of this view.

Pope Urban VIII also believed that Mogila had indicated a desire

¹⁴Malushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁵"Letopis Lvovskogo Bratstva," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniya*, St. Petersburg, 1849, Part LXII, p. 152.

¹⁶*Cf. infra*, p. 17.

to bring the Orthodox people into the Catholic fold. To this end he wrote to one of his ministers:

The fact that your most noble self, together with the excellent brother Peter Mogila, Metropolitan of the Ruthenians . . . are planning to bring all the Ruthenians to the unity of the Apostolic Chair . . . affords an example of most conspicuous piety and outstanding religious devotion.¹⁷

No evidence exists substantiating this statement. If Mogila had entered into negotiations with the Pope, it would certainly seem that he did so in the manner of a true inheritor of the traditions of Byzantium, which had often held out the inducement of wholesale Orthodox conversion to Catholicism to secure other advantages from the West.

The Pope, disappointed in his expectations, but without abandoning hope, addressed Mogila directly in 1643. His letter revealed clearly the Papal attitude to Orthodox Christianity and the impracticability of finding any basis upon which to reach a mutual understanding:

Although we are aware that your Fraternity is separated from us both by religion and location, nevertheless our Apostolic Concern has turned towards you, since we desire to lead you into the sanctuary of the Catholic Faith where Our Lord has chosen to make His Abode, and we wish to summon you to tread upon that most safe road upon which the Papal Keys open the doors of the Eternal Kingdom to believing peoples. Harken, oh most reverend brother, to salutary counsels that are offered to you not only by the City that is the Father of Nations, but by very Heaven itself. Take thought for your salvation and for the salvation of those who tread in your footsteps and who will naturally follow the course that you will indicate by your example. The Sacred College of Cardinals, upon whom devolves the dissemination of the Catholic Faith, will give you a letter touching upon this most serious matter; but if there should remain anything requiring more detailed explanation or seemingly demand any further elucidation, you may send two of your more experienced monks to us. They will be entertained in a kindly and friendly manner, and beyond doubt they will come to know how pure, how true, how linked to every type of virtue, is that glorious doctrine which is professed in the Holy Cathedral of St. Peter. Then, as we expect, they will return to you educated in the knowledge of salvation and telling of the Testaments of Our Lord, by which your people may be snatched from the jaws of infidel wolves and led into the true fold of Christ.¹⁸

It is not known whether Mogila replied to this letter; whereas his opposition to the Uniates was continuous and implacable. The

¹⁷*Monumenta Historica Poloniae*, Rome, 1860, Vol. III, p. 412.

¹⁸*Historia Russiae Monumenta*, St. Petersburg, 1842, Vol. II, pp. 215-216.

following incident well illustrates its nature. The Uniate Metropolitan complained that Mogila, while paying a visit to the Cathedral of Lutsk, a former Uniate Church which had come under Orthodox jurisdiction, ordered the religious articles to be thrown away because they had been consecrated by Uniate ministers.¹⁹

Although Mogila played a vital role in ecclesiastical affairs, his main contribution to posterity was in the field of Orthodox education. In this connection the importance of his work cannot be overestimated.

Prior to Mogila's succession to the office of Archimandrite of the Pechersky Monastery in 1628, a lack of good Orthodox schools had compelled numerous students to seek advanced training in Jesuit institutions, a circumstance which had encouraged the latter to open a college in Kiev. Mogila decided to organize an Orthodox College to compete with the Jesuits, and by 1631 it was ready to give instruction.

Members of its faculty were Isaiah Trophimovich, Sylvester Kossov, Athanasius Kalnophoisky, and Innocent Gisel. It was thought that, even before he became Archimandrite, Mogila had encouraged and aided these men to go abroad in order to receive a thorough education to equip them as teachers of Orthodox doctrine, able to compete with the Jesuits. Mogila's new College offered eight subjects in its curriculum modelled along Western lines: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, and, above all, theology of an uncompromising Orthodox character. Instruction was given in Greek, Slavic, and Latin.

On the occasion of the College's opening Mogila stated its aims:

I, Peter Mogila, by the Grace of God Archimandrite of the Pechersky Monastery, seeing a great danger to men's souls in the Orthodox Church due to the ignorance of the clergy and the lack of instruction of the youth, and wishing, with God's help, to avert this danger and to find those who have strayed from the paths of Orthodoxy, have decided to found a school in order that we may instruct the youth in all forms of piety, good character, and free sciences.²⁰

He further stated that the College was to be a place

. . . where all shall live together as parts of one body, under the supervision and direction of the Archimandrite, receiving liberal instruction in the Greek, Latin, and Slavic tongues, together with instruction in the Orthodox Faith of Eastern Piety, for the adornment and strengthening of the Sacred Orthodox Church.²¹

¹⁹ *Arkhiv, op. cit.*, pp. 740-741.

²⁰ *Opisanie Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry*, Kiev, 1847, p. 173.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

The Bogoiavlensky Church School in Kiev, which gave preparatory instruction in Orthodox theology, had over the years attracted a certain number of pupils and was considered a bastion of Orthodoxy. The success of Mogila's new College, however, was so marked that this school began to decline and by the end of 1631 many requests were made for the unification of the two institutions. Mogila entertained the proposal favorably; the merger was speedily accomplished, and the new school was very successful.

This development had an adverse effect upon the Jesuit College, and its members and supporters undertook to spread rumors, also repeated by some Orthodox clergymen, to the effect that men educated abroad were not qualified to give proper instruction in Orthodox theology. The people, aware that some teaching was done in Latin, were inclined to listen to these rumors, and considerable opposition arose in certain quarters. Mogila dropped the title of "College"; whereupon the opposition began gradually and peacefully to disappear. In his declining years Mogila was able to see his College growing in Kiev and his concepts of education spreading to other towns.

Mogila set up a printing-press in the Pechersky Monastery, on which were published many books that enjoyed wide circulation and influence. He issued a corrected edition of the *Sluzhebnik* (Missal) used in Orthodox churches, and further corrections and additions led to a second edition in 1639. A monumental work was compiled under Mogila's sponsorship, the great *Trebnik* (Orthodox Prayer Book), which appeared in 1646. He also published a Catechism, which was a definitive statement of Orthodox dogma.²²

Since church books might be published by anyone who wished to do so, without submitting them to authoritative scrutiny, Mogila detected many errors, discrepancies, and mistakes in them. To remedy this condition he decided to act as censor himself; in a letter written in 1637 he cautioned the Lvov Brotherhood:

On our side we ask that the Brotherhoods do not venture, without our archbishoply approval, to publish books on the Lvov Brotherhood's press, at the risk of incurring our displeasure.²³

In this undertaking Mogila was entirely successful. The changes

²²For a complete list of Mogila's numerous religious publications, see Emile Picot, "Pierre Movila (Mogila)," *Bibliographie Hellénique*, Paris, 1896, Vol. IV, pp. 120-150.

²³*Pamiatniki . . .*, Vol. III, p. 86.

in the text of church books, that he made from comparisons with Greek originals, were on the whole accepted peacefully; opposition was usually put down by stern warnings, of which the following is an example:

In Lvov people have been recently found who have dared, without my knowledge, permission, or blessing, to publish on their printing-press religious books, filled with their mistakes. . . . Our displeasure will fall upon those who buy Mass Books published in Lvov and use them for saying the Mass.²⁴

Mogila was a man of a contradictory nature. His actions were at times violent; his writings often revealed a certain truculence.²⁵ Erlich, his contemporary, called him ". . . a thorough lover of this world,"²⁶ and at the same time he was responsible for the *Confessio Orthodoxa*, a work of scholarship and piety that continues to exert an influence in the Orthodox world.²⁷

Mogila's name has not come down among those of the famous men of the times; it is little known apart from religious and documentary sources. One reason for his comparative obscurity may perhaps be found in his personal life. Not long after an age in which a prominent clerical figure, Cyril Terlecki, ". . . was tried for murder, rape, and brigandage,"²⁸ Mogila's detractors never ventured to assail his moral conduct. He led an ascetic life in the Pechersky Monastery; no scandals ever involved him.

It is erroneous to attribute Catholic leanings to him.²⁹ Indeed, in view of his noble birth, his connections with the Polish court, and his interest in Western and Jesuit learning, his unwavering devotion to the Orthodox Church becomes all the more striking. Critical scholarship has exaggerated the use of Latin as solely the

²⁴"Petr Mogila, Mitropolit Kievskii," *Chteniya v Imperatorskom Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete*, Moscow, January-March, 1877, p. 93.

²⁵A good example comes from his *Universal* of 1640: "The great wisdom of God has entrusted to my care the Sacred Russian Church, in which is united the whole Russian Orthodox people as beloved sheep, so that I may persecute the rapacious wolves, who, having arisen from among the unhappy Uniates, and having grown stronger during the course of years, have been disturbing the peace of our church." Quoted in *Chteniya*, p. 29.

²⁶Solovev, *op. cit.*, Col. 1489.

²⁷Found in *Orientalia Christiana*, Rome, 1927, Vol. X, No. 39. This modern text was carefully prepared by two Jesuit priests.

²⁸W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine: A History*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 84.

²⁹E. Winter, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine*, Leipzig, 1942, p. 89; D. J. Mirtsuk, *Handbuch der Ukraine*, Leipzig, 1941, p. 315.

vehicle for Catholic liturgy, the strongly Orthodox Lvov Brotherhood, over which Mogila exercised no personal control, had by 1637 acquired a substantial library that contained many Latin works.³⁰ The use of Latin was restricted; in the curriculum of Mogila's College it was never accorded more than an equal position with the Greek and Slavic languages. It is better to conclude that Mogila, himself a very learned man,³¹ could see beyond the passions of contemporary prejudice against Latin.

In 1640 Mogila wrote to the Tsar:

Tsar, Lord, and Grand Duke Mikhail Fedorovitch, Autocrat of all Russia, the humble father, Metropolitan of Kiev, Peter, together with all his clergy, respectfully salutes your Imperial Majesty. If it please your Eminence, by your Imperial blessing and decree cause to have built in your Imperial city a Monastery, in which the Elders and Brothers of the communal Kievan Brotherhood Monastery may live, and unceasingly pray to God for your Imperial Majesty, and for your blessed rule, and for the God-given regal affluence of your mightiness; and where they may teach the children of Boyars and of the lesser sort in Greek and Slavic. The action will be pleasing to God, honorable to your Imperial Eminence, and glorious in all lands.³²

A little more than ten years later, when Bogdan Khmelnitsky, the famous Cossack leader, placed the Ukrainian lands under the protection of Moscow, he brought the Tsar much more than the troubled Cossack state. He put the best center of Orthodox learning that then existed at the Tsar's disposal.

It has become a commonplace to assert that Peter the Great brought Russia into the area of Western civilization, but perhaps his efforts would not have met with such great success if Mogila and his successors had not laid a prior intellectual foundation by their activities in Kiev. Mogila's letter to the Tsar reveals that he was beginning to look Eastward; a careful survey of the cultural development of Muscovy in following generations will not fail to show his influence.

³⁰ "Let. Lvov. Brat.," *Zhur. Min. Narod. Pros.*, p. 154.

³¹ For a list of books purchased for his own use, see *Arkhiv*, Vol. VIII, Part 1, pp. 186-189.

³² *Akty otnosiashchiesya k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii*, St. Petersburg, 1861, Vol. III, p. 39.

The Armenian Church in Soviet Policy

BY EDWARD ALEXANDER

THE current peace campaign under the auspices of the Communist-controlled World Peace Council is in full swing in the Soviet Union and the satellites.

Spear-heading the drive for signatures to the "peace petitions" are the statements of prominent religious figures in the U.S.S.R., as has been the procedure in similar campaigns of the past. These periodic exhortations by Christian and Moslem leaders are intended, of course, to create in the West not only an impression of religious tolerance by the Soviet government, but also support of its political aims by the Church.

This practice represents only one aspect of the overall exploitation of the Church by the Soviets. Domestically, of course, the war against religion continues under the banner of classical Communism, characterizing it as the "opiate of the masses." For just as thirty-seven years ago, religious faith today still represents a serious obstacle to the development of the "Soviet man."

But abroad, the Communist line for export was and is much more restrained. In the West, the Kremlin is purveying the idea of a new rapport between Church and State and the fostering of freedom of worship in the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet government realizes full well that such a policy, if successful, could lead to the physical and psychological disarming of the West. Consequently, it pursues this policy unceasingly in the communities where religious faith prevails.

In this category are the many émigré groups in the free world whose native lands have been absorbed into the Soviet Union. A comprehensive study of post-war Soviet efforts to indoctrinate these peoples has yet to be made. Russians, Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Georgians, Armenians, and the countless Islamic peoples in the western world have all been the target of tendentious ecclesiastical declarations from Moscow. A case in point is the Armenian people, an examination of whose recent history offers a striking instance of Soviet duplicity towards the Church.

The tragic events of the World War I massacres dispersed Arme-

nians to the four corners of the earth. Wherever they settled Armenians became loyal citizens, contributing in large share to the economic, political, and cultural life of their adopted countries. But the yearning for the homeland remained—a homeland enslaved since 1921 by Soviet tyranny.

It is said that the first act of Armenian settlers everywhere is to found a church. The Kremlin policy-makers knew of this devotion for the Armenian Church. Established in 301 A.D. with its own spiritual head, the Catholicos, the Church of Armenia had served as refuge throughout centuries of invasion of this Christian nation. The potentialities of the situation were not lost on Moscow.

In consequence, that very religion which for over a thousand years had been the bulwark of the Armenian people became a weapon in the hands of the Kremlin.

The first manifestation of this policy was the delayed announcement in 1937 that the Supreme Patriarch in Soviet Armenia, Catholicos Khoren, had died. The news from Armenia said that he had died a natural death. Yet, strangely enough for one so prominent, the news did not come out for three days.

It is generally accepted today that the elderly clergyman could no longer tolerate the hypocrisy of the Soviet government and the schisms it had created among Armenians in Europe, the Near East and the Americas, and had been disposed of.

The Mother Chair, as the Catholicate is called, remained vacant, although a *locum tenens* was appointed in 1938 in the person of Archbishop Georg Chorekjian.

For three years more, the Soviet government continued its policy of combatting the Church and persecuting the clergy domestically, while carrying on a sanctimonious campaign externally in support of the Church.

A major change took place domestically, however, in 1941, the year of the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R. The overwhelming successes of the Wehrmacht were due in no small part to the fact that it met with no resistance in many areas of its advance. Even more, as has been amply documented, the Germans were hailed as liberators and greeted with bread and salt. The repercussions of these events instigated a serious reappraisal of defense policy in Moscow, resulting in the historic decision to stress the defense of the "homeland" rather than "Communism."

In putting patriotism above ideology, the Kremlin now could turn, as it did, to the Church for support. And the Armenian Church,

along with the others in the U.S.S.R., played its role in the nation's defense, its clergymen campaigning tirelessly for the "fatherland." Their efforts impressed Stalin to the degree that at war's end he summoned Archbishop Chorenkian to Moscow and decorated him with the Defense of the Caucasus Medal.

In June, 1945, an Ecclesiastical Conclave was called in Soviet Armenia to elect a new Catholicos, the first in eight years. Officials of the Armenian Church from all over the world gathered at the invitation of the Soviet government.

With considerable to-do, Chorenkian was elected Catholicos Georg VI, Supreme Patriarch of All Armenians.

The Soviets went to great pains to record and film the centuries-old ceremony of consecration in all its pomp and splendour. No less an admirer of the U.S.S.R. than Dr. Hewlett Johnson, the Dean of Canterbury, who witnessed the proceedings as an invited guest, has written of the obvious discomfort of the Catholicos. Added to the close atmosphere of the 1600-year old Cathedral of Etchmiadzin and the heavy raiments of office, the elderly Patriarch had to suffer the intense heat of klieg lights "only a few feet from his face. . . . Patient under the blazing lights, great beads of perspiration gathered on his brow. . . . He endured without flinching."¹

The films of the ceremony were dispatched to all parts of the world as new evidence of religious freedom in the homeland. Not only some of the old émigrés, but even recently displaced persons who knew Communism more intimately were convinced that genuine freedom was descending on Armenia. The films were the prelude to the clarion call which followed: the call to return to the homeland. The Kremlin was already exploiting the sacred office of the Catholicate to lure back expatriates.

The official announcement from the Mother Chair followed shortly, appealing to all Armenians to leave their adopted countries and return to the land of their fathers.

The response was not inconsiderable, 100,000 in all, of which 150 were from the United States. The various Soviet embassies and consulates arranged elaborate farewells at the piers. The repatriates were not all Soviet sympathizers, but the opportunity to return to their native land where Armenians suffered upheaval and persecution and defended their Christian faith overcame all political scruples.

¹Dr. Hewlett Johnson, *Soviet Russia Since the War*, 1947, pp. 213-214.

Those who had viewed the consecration films as indicating relaxed conditions in Armenia and who eventually arrived there (many had a last-minute change of heart and escaped) soon were overcome by a disquieting realization: inside the borders of Armenia the Catholicos was a stranger to his own people.

There were other disturbing revelations as well concerning Soviet reality: severe shortages in shoes, clothing, and other necessities; food was still rationed and high-priced; housing was flimsy and ramshackle with plumbing that was already obsolete in the West.

Having achieved this coup, the Soviet government put the Catholicos to new uses. In 1950 the Kremlin sent out messages in the name of the Holy See urging clergymen to sign the Stockholm Peace Appeal.

Only a few weeks after the Communist aggression in Korea, the Catholicos' name was signed to a cable to Soviet delegate Malik, President that month (August) of the Security Council, condemning the United States' bombing of North Korea. In addition to attacks on the United States, other communications included abuse of the British government and the Roman Catholic Church—all of which have always been, of course, favored targets of Soviet propaganda.

Action followed upon action to convince Armenians abroad of an independent authority enjoyed by the Patriarchate, at the same time attempting to convey a unanimity of policy with Moscow. No information is available on the undoubtedly anguish of the Catholicos himself, a man who had enjoyed the respect of all Armenians for his patriotism and intellectual achievements. But in his native country he still remained a mute symbol.

Many of the 3000 Armenian displaced persons who have been relocated in the United States since the end of World War II have revealed the degree of anonymity suffered by the Patriarch in Soviet Armenia. Several expressed surprise on learning of his existence, confessing that this information was the first they had received in many years.

These expatriate Armenians were speaking of the fact that one searched in vain in the Soviet Armenian press for even a mention of the Catholicos. Whereas the Communist and fellow-traveler press in the United States and other countries made propaganda capital out of the Patriarch and his office.

It was in this manner that the Armenian world community learned in May, 1954 that Georg VI lay seriously ill. Even the anti-Communist press gave the story front page play. For several days

thereafter there was an official silence, though rumors of his death were widely disseminated. Finally, the news that Georg VI had passed away was broadcast by Radio Moscow. A study of Soviet press treatment of this news reveals the accurate picture of the gap between domestic and foreign policy towards religion—a policy which apparently has not changed under Khrushchev from what it was under Stalin.

On May ninth the official daily *Sovyedagan Hayasdan* first told its readers of the illness of the Catholicos. But unlike the front-page spread of the free world press, the Soviet newspaper devoted five brief sentences to the news, on page three. It is also noteworthy that this Tass dispatch in May disclosed that the Prelate had taken ill in April.

In the days that followed, American-Armenians offered prayers for the ailing Patriarch, and, typically, their instruction from the Prelacy in North America was noticeably missing from the brief announcement in Armenia. Meanwhile, the Soviet press was silent.

On May 11, the following news story appeared in *Sovyedagan Hayasdan*—again on page three: “The Armenian News Agency representative has learned from the Etchmiadzin Supreme Ecclesiastical Council that, following a serious illness, the 87-year-old Catholicos of All Armenians, Supreme Patriarch Georg VI passed away.”

The death of the Catholicos appeared to be of even less concern to the Soviet government than his illness. While abroad, in contrast, obituaries, eulogies and editorials flooded the Communist press alongside black-bordered photographs of the deceased.

Soon thereafter, cables were sent from Armenia to church officials in the free world, inviting them to attend the burial ceremonies. The funeral took place on May 27. On that day, at long last, *Sovyedagan Hayasdan*, in deference to the visitors from abroad, ran a brief obituary of the Prelate.

The Soviet Armenian radio at Yerevan began broadcasting the funeral proceedings from Etchmiadzin Cathedral in great detail but, significantly, in short-wave transmissions to Armenians *abroad*. The Kremlin was exploiting the Patriarch to the last.

The visiting dignitaries were heard in tributes to the deceased, but the local population had no access to these either. Nor was it permitted to hear the visitors' comments made later on the “gigantic progress of Armenia under Soviet rule.”

The events of the late Catholicos' nine-year tenure have now passed into the gloom of Soviet history. But the process goes on.

Again in the forefront of the present campaign are two Armenian Bishops who have issued declarations supporting the World Peace Council appeal for signatures.

Meanwhile, reports circulated in the free world indicate that elections for a new Catholicos will probably take place this autumn. Considerable preparatory activity has been reported in Armenia, particularly at the Cathedral of Etchmiadzin undergoing renovation for the new coronation.

The election of a new Catholicos, however, can be expected to exercise no influence whatsoever domestically, but to supply the Kremlin with another agency for exploitation in the implementing of Soviet policies abroad.

Book Reviews

ROSTOW, W. W. *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*. New York, W. W. Norton, 1953. 281 pp. \$3.95.

MOORE, BARRINGTON, JR. *Terror and Progress, U.S.S.R.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954. 261 pp. \$4.50.

Thanks to the successful and productive research performed by the experts on Soviet government, such broad fields as law, economy, social problems, and domestic and international policy, have ceased to be as enigmatic as formerly. It has become possible not only to describe Soviet reality in a synthetic manner but also to point out with a certain exactitude the forthcoming development of Soviet social and political life.

The books under review analyse the forces which determine the changes of Soviet policy and secure or hamper the realization of the government's plans. Dr. Rostow sets forth in concise and comprehensive form abundant factual material. A large part of his work is devoted to "the evolution of Soviet rule," the process of bureaucratization, the changes in economic life and distribution of national income, the evolution of Soviet ideology, its deviation from orthodox Marxism, the adaptation of Russian nationalism to the Communist cause, the social structure, the submission of social and cultural life to the Party's control, and the elaboration of practical international politics. In this part the author refers to the works of renowned specialists and expounds the factual data characterizing the development of the Soviet

regime and politics. Having read the first part, the reader begins to understand that "the Soviet system" is not "something static and unchanging but a recognizable process of historical evolution," as M. F. Millican, Director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has written in his prefatory note.

Dr. Rostow has dedicated the second and the most original part of his work to the analysis of "cohesive forces, instabilities, and tensions in contemporary Soviet society." Since the late thirties the legal order in the Soviet Union has been stabilized and the Soviet government has secured control over the economic, social, and cultural life of the country. Yet some changes are inevitable and seem to be portentous. Some observers believe, therefore, that the Soviet government will be forced to retreat and that the regime itself will be transformed into a more liberal form; others expect a revolution which will break the Communist apparatus and will open to the peoples of Russia new ways for the development of their social and economic life. A scientific approach to this problem is more than timely, and the book under review does just this.

Mr. Rostow's conclusion is that "Nothing . . . justifies an easy optimism concerning the process of transition." But he admits the instability of executive power, the growing technocracy, the popular disaffection, in particular among national minorities, intellectuals, and industrial workers. Thus he acknowledges the possibility of in-

ternal changes under the pressure of "the forces and attitudes which are not diminishing but are probably growing in strength." The possible effect, he believes, may be a limited despotism, a kind of "constitutionality" either without an essential change in the economic system and industrial policy, or even with a trend favorable for the development of "a more peaceful and stable world."

Dr. Moore's book is a valuable addition to Professor Rostow's work. In the first chapters he points out some essential characteristics of the present stage of the Soviet regime, such as the change of Party-men from agitators to administrators (p. 31); the specific character of the Soviet industrial expansion "admirably adapted to a world of chronic emergency short of war," and with nothing in sight to take place of this specifically political trend (p. 71); the ruthlessness of the regimentation "partially mitigated by corruption" (p. 91); etc. A special chapter is dedicated to the "impact and functions of terror," as an indispensable instrument of control in the Soviet system. The author explains that the "new regime still requires terror as an essential aspect of its power" as "too little terror diminishes control at the center by permitting the growth of independent centers of authority" (p. 178).

Dr. Moore's book has many interesting details and original points, but the most important is his last chapter, "Images of the Future." The author does not believe in a peaceful transformation of the Communist regime into a democratic system (p. 194). On the other hand, he is inclined to regard as "a rather unlikely extreme" the disappearance of the Bolsheviks in the course of the

next half-dozen years (p. 221); he considers as most probable some gradual changes as, for example, the decline of power of the secret police and the Party, and the further rise of industrial management, engineers, and technical administration (p. 189). "Although the Party and the secret police would remain the dominant elements in the State . . . the military forces might gain somewhat in influence" (p. 224); "the collective farms would become closer to genuine cooperatives" (p. 192); "a political system approaching a technocracy has more than mere plausibility" (p. 224); "there would also be an increase in the authority of local officials and a corresponding loss of power on the part of Kremlin" (p. 226);—such are some of the conclusions of Dr. Moore. They are certainly not indisputable, especially as far as the transformation of *kolkhozes* and the decentralization of power are concerned.

Both authors have analyzed various forces in Soviet society which determine changes of the Soviet domestic policy. The present economic crisis of the Soviet system deserves a special treatment. Its impact on the further development of the Soviet regime may be of greatest importance. Both authors passed over this significant factor, probably because it was still not sufficiently clear at the time when they prepared their works for publication. They also bypass the significance of Western policy in regard to the new Soviet diplomatic *démarche*. In the meantime, the West can either help the Soviet government to prolong its existence, or, depending on whether it is lenient or firm, conversely, accelerate its failure. And, finally, it is not of minor importance that symptoms of cor-

ruption and demoralization of the bureaucracy of both upper and middle strata and especially of the young generation disclose that revolutionary enthusiasm is fading and that Communism has reached the stage of degeneration.

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GALENSON, WALTER. *Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955. 273 pp. \$5.50.

HODGMAN, DONALD R. *Soviet Industrial Production 1928-1951*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954. 214 pp. \$5.00.

During the cold war between the Western democracies and the Soviet bloc the appearance of these two studies is extremely valuable. One of the basic ultimate tests of comparative strength of the two rival aggregations of power lies in their relative economic strength not only at the present time but also in the likelihood of economic growth in the two systems. Even if the tensions of the cold war should be alleviated these studies are of great importance in making an evaluation of the merits of a free enterprise system in comparison with a planned society.

These studies were undertaken under the auspices of two of the leading research organizations which are engaged in detailed studies of the Soviet economy. *Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry* is a Research Study by the Rand Corporation and *Soviet Industrial Production 1928-1951* is a product of the Russian Research Center at

Harvard. The two books are closely complementary to each other and taken together present a gold mine of facts concerning Soviet economic productivity not to be found elsewhere.

The early sections of these two studies deal with such matters as the significance and limitations of the productivity concept, Soviet labor productivity statistics, and their comparability with United States statistics, official measures of Soviet industrial production, value-added weights for Soviet industry, and statistical procedures in constructing the production index. These chapters are rather technical and will be of interest primarily to those with some knowledge of statistical method. To such they will be very informative in showing how Soviet statistics of productivity are derived and in their discussion of the reliability of and the bias in Soviet statistics. Many excellent tabular presentations of productivity in various sections of the Soviet economy are given.

Galenson analyzes labor productivity in the two countries by a series of industry studies. The industries covered are coal mining, iron ore mining, crude oil and natural gas, iron and steel, machinery, cotton textile manufacturing, shoe manufacturing, and beet sugar processing. With the exception of machinery, the industries covered are those for which there is a relatively homogeneous output and productivity measurements are given in physical units. This makes it possible to avoid the bias in Soviet value-of-output statistics and the difficulty of making comparisons between the value of the ruble and the dollar. These industry studies show that labor productivity in the Soviet

Union is still considerably below that in the United States but that, particularly in the much emphasized heavy industries, productivity has been increasing at a more rapid rate than in the United States.

For the non-specialist, Galenson's summary and conclusions dealing with international productivity comparisons, factors behind the productivity trends and differences, and the future prospects for Soviet productivity will be the most interesting. The following paragraph in regard to future trends in Soviet labor productivity is well worth quoting in full: "On the basis of the Soviet experience, the hypothesis may be advanced that a nation undergoing industrialization at a relatively late stage of world economic development is able, for those industries for which a high rate of capital investment can be maintained, rapidly to narrow the gap in output per worker that separates it from the more advanced nations by the installation of new capital equipment. However, these initial gains can carry it up only to a certain point, beyond which further gains may depend to a much greater extent on industrial management, labor skills, and the whole gamut of factors which are customarily emphasized in comparing the differences in productivity among advanced industrial nations."

Hodgman has done pioneer work in developing an independent index of Soviet Industrial output by using Soviet data on wage pay rolls in the individual industrial branches. After exaggerations and distortions have been removed this index shows that the annual rate of industrial growth during the 'thirties was at the high rate of some 14 per cent. Data since that time have been less complete,

but Hodgman reaches the conclusion that in contrast to official claims of a more than twelve-fold increase in industrial output during the period of the first four Five-Year plans, the expansion has been only about five and one-half. He estimates that the increase in the production of consumers' industrial goods per capita has been about 88 per cent, which is less than half the Soviet claim.

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WARTH, ROBERT D. *The Allies and the Russian Revolution*. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1954. 394 pp. \$4.50.

This book is, in the author's words, "a pioneer attempt to relate the diplomatic history of the first year of the Russian Revolution in so far as it concerns Russia's relations with the other Allied Powers." The thesis of the book is that "Allied policy and diplomacy was based on an almost total lack of understanding of the forces and the events of the Russian Revolution." The book covers the period from the March Revolution of 1917 to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of the next year.

This book is undoubtedly the best on this subject to have thus far appeared. Its organization is good and the events of this period are faithfully recorded. The chapter on Allied diplomacy and the Stockholm Socialist Conference is the fullest and most complete discussion of this conference to have appeared. The author is to be commended for the intensive research which went into the writing of this book and for the excellent critical bibliography which

is included. The American Archives and the papers of Americans who were present in Russia in 1917 together with those of governmental personnel from President Wilson on down were thoroughly searched. British, French, and Russian materials were used extensively. In addition to this, Dr. Warth consulted many theses and dissertations pertinent to his subject which have been completed at American universities.

It is questionable, however, to state as the author does, that further revelations from British, French, and Russian archives, when they become available to scholars, will not modify the basic picture in any material way. There is certainly some evidence to suggest, in regard to the conduct of relations with Russia in 1917, that there was a difference of opinion within the British government which had a definite effect upon the implementation of British policy toward the Provisional Government, and later, toward the Bolsheviks. The full record of the reports and the activities of people like Sir Bernard Pares, Sir Winston Churchill, and Sir Alfred Knox has not yet been made available. Materials which could be someday seen in the archives of such European neutrals as Switzerland and Sweden are bound to be of great interest.

Some other criticisms might be made of this book. It is probably incorrect for the author to state that Prince George Lvov, in 1917, was "an honest but colorless right-wing Kadet." It is true that, in 1905-1906, Prince Lvov had been associated with the Cadet party. After the unfortunate Viborg Manifesto, with which he did not agree, he drifted away and gradually broke

all contact with the Cadet party. In 1917 he belonged to no faction.

It is probably correct technically to call G. V. Plekhanov a Menshevik. However, in 1917, he was far removed from the Menshevik Internationalists like Martov and Suhonov and he was not accepted by such Menshevik Defencists as Irakli Tseretelli. He would be more correctly identified with the *Edinstvo* group.

Evidence does exist (Pingaud, A., "Les Projects D'Intervention Japonais" in *Revue Des Deux Mondes*, vol. 59, September, 1930, pp. 31-59) that the first moves for Japanese intervention in Russia were made by France at the Congress of Allied Powers in Petrograd in January of 1917. Further, after the collapse of the Russian July offensive, Paris suggested to London that a Japanese expeditionary force be brought in to maintain the Eastern (Russian) Front. This is nowhere mentioned in the book.

In dealing with foreign newspaper comment on the Kornilov revolt, Dr. Warth compares unfavorably the dispatches in the London *Times* with those appearing in the Manchester *Guardian*. Nowhere in the text does the author point out the pro-Bolshevik propensities of Mr. M. Philips Price, the Russian correspondent of the *Guardian*. The almost blatant anti-semitism of Mr. Robert Wilton of the *Times*, which appears not only in these dispatches, but also in his book, *Russia's Agony*, is not commented upon. This makes for a very unfair comparison. The author, in his bibliographical notes on Price, does point out that he was a Marxist, but not a Bolshevik.

There will be those who will object to the manner in which Dr. Warth has handled the controversial ques-

tion of the relationship between the Bolsheviks and the Germans during the year 1917. He states that the bulk of the so-called "Sisson documents" were forgeries. He does not state, however, that Professor J. Franklin Jameson of the *American Historical Review* and Professor S. N. Harper of the University of Chicago found that the first fifty-five documents were genuine, and that Professor Harper never retracted his findings on this matter. In his recently published book, *A Century of Conflict* (page 47, footnote), Dr. S. T. Possony states that material available in the German World War I documents now in the National Archives of Washington tends to confirm the evidence contained in the "Sisson documents."

The book of S. P. Melgunov, *Zolotoi Nemetskii Klyuch Bolshevikov*, is nowhere cited in regard to this problem. This book contains several interesting revelations. For example, Melgunov states that he was told by the Communist historian, Pokrovsky, in the presence of several witnesses, that the German Social Democrats had furnished money to the Bolsheviks. He further relates how the great Social Democratic theorist, Bernstein, charged that he had incontrovertible proof that German money had gone to the Bolsheviks before the October Revolution and he defied the German Communists to sue him for this allegation. Similar evidence in the book of A. F. Kerensky, *The Crucifixion of Liberty*, is nowhere acknowledged by the author.

There is no mention whatsoever in this book of the celebrated case of the Swiss Socialist and German agent, Grimm, who was expelled from Russia for his relations with the German government. In Grimm's

case, the Provisional Government had the compromising telegrams, which involved him, in its possession. Even the Internationalist Menshevik, Suhanov, whom Dr. Warth cites frequently, admits that the Bolsheviks knew all about Grimm's activities but that they never informed the other Russian Socialists about them. (Suhanov, N. N., *Zapiski o Revolyutsii*, IV, pp. 222-230.)

Perhaps Dr. Warth relied too heavily on the testimony of Robbins and Lockhardt for his story of Allied dealings with the Bolsheviks. Certainly a further interpretation can be placed upon the concluding section of the celebrated Peace Appeal of November, 1917. This was the first use of a tactic with which we are altogether too familiar today. It was certainly interpreted by many of the Allied statesmen as an appeal to a section of their populations to revolt against their lawfully constituted governments and, as such, it helps explain some of the pressure for intervention.

In spite of these criticisms, this book is a valuable piece of historical research, and it remains a contribution of worth to our knowledge of the Russian Revolution.

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LEBED, ANDREI and YAKOVLEV, BORIS. *The Importance of Hydro-Technical Projects for Soviet Transportation* [in Russian]. Munich, Germany, Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R., 1954. 200 pp.

FEDOROVSKY, N. *Characteristics of Dirt Roads in the U.S.S.R. Part I: General Considerations* [in Rus-

sian]. Munich, Germany, Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R., 1954. 200 pp.

The two monographs under review refer to the problem of communications within the U.S.S.R., a vital field of Soviet economics little known outside of that country. They are written in Russian, with brief résumés in English, German, and French.

Messrs. Lebed's and Yakovlev's book is a highly technical study. For the specialist it provides a mine of information. Even though the authors have rarely gone beyond official Soviet sources and publications, they have assembled and analysed these with utmost care. An historical introduction presents a good survey of the state of Russian waterways before the Revolution. The Soviet period is treated in great detail. Soviet water transportation projects are discussed in the following order: the early period of the Baltic-White sea canal (1931-1933); the Dnieprostroy (1932); the Kakhovka hydro-electrical project (under construction), and others; the linking of the Baltic with the Black sea, and of the Dnieper with the Don; the great Volga with its major hydro-electrical projects at Kuybyshev and Stalingrad, now under construction; the linking of Moscow with the Caspian and Black seas, and also the Volga with the Don (the Volga-Don canal, opened in 1952). The chapter on the projected works in Siberia and Russian Turkistan which follows is of particular interest, even though the distinction between projects of real economic value and those purely utopian in character is not everywhere adequately drawn. (Part of this

chapter, "The Angarstroy," appeared in *The Russian Review*, January, 1955, pp. 50-54.) The role of forced labor in these projects is presented in detail. There are numerous valuable charts and maps, and the appendix includes important legislative acts. A bibliography of 184 titles closes the study. It would be most useful to provide an index in any future editions of the book.

The authors of this study have carefully scanned the latest Soviet literature available on the subject: books, pamphlets, periodicals, and the daily press. In doing so they have made every effort to detect propaganda and deliberate distortions in the official Soviet sources. They recognize, however, that they may not always have been successful.

The reader of this book will find little information on how effectively the cross-country waterway systems of the U.S.S.R. fulfill their purpose as regular arteries of transcontinental trade, the length of useful navigation seasons, and the tonnage of the freight carried. Such information is never divulged by the Soviet government, except inadvertently, and it takes painstaking research to produce such material out of data often unrelated to the researchers' main interest. The chief weakness of the monograph is that in citing figures the authors generally follow Soviet sources, seldom providing any comparisons with other countries. This leads to a certain one-sidedness in the treatment of the subject. It would have been helpful, for example, to tell the reader that the projected main dam at Stalingrad is to be 158 feet high as against the 726 feet of the Hoover Dam on the Colorado River. Since freight

loads are kept secret by the Soviet government, it would have been useful to indicate that despite the grandiose work on water communications, 86% of aggregate freight movements (in ton-kilometers) was still carried before the war (1940) by heavily overtaxed railroad facilities, leaving 14% to water, air, and road communications combined. Nor has this relationship changed significantly to date.

Soviet enthusiasm and drum beating will not alter the fact that European Russia's vast spaces are generally flat, making major rivers relatively poor sources for harnessing hydro-electric energy usefully and economically. Raising the level of the rivers calls for the flooding of huge areas with resulting wastage of vast spaces of land in a country as land-hungry as Russia. The same condition requires the erection of dams of unusual length at tremendous expense. The authors cite the figure of 5 klm. (about three miles) for the projected dam at Stalingrad. The dams at Kakhovka and Kuybyshev are to be of similar length. It may be relevant to note here that the projected dam on the St. Lawrence River, near Massena, to be completed in 1959, is to be about half a mile in length and will contain 32 turbine generator units as against 17 in the Stalingrad project. The erection of excessively long barriers in the U.S.S.R. raises major technical problems. We gather from this study that the two problems most difficult to solve appear to be leakages of the dams and storms originating on the huge, shallow, internal seas, artificially built, occurring in areas of severe winds which endanger the structure of the dams. The latter, because of their length,

cannot be adequately reinforced throughout.

It should be noted in conclusion that the authors have deliberately confined their research to the construction of waterways in the U.S.S.R. Soviet planners, on the other hand, have always considered the subject of waterways as an integral part of greater projects tied to the building of electric power (for supplying industry) and the irrigation of lands. They have wanted to combine all these factors into a grand, all-embracing scheme: the "electrification" of Russia (Lenin's purported principal legacy to the cause of Communism: the GOELRO—cornerstone of Soviet planning). By limiting their study to water transportation alone, the authors have diminished the value of their work as an analysis of Soviet planning. Nevertheless, the wealth of information assembled on the Soviet system of water transportation makes this monograph a very valuable contribution to the study of economic conditions in the U.S.S.R.

The material presented in *Characteristics of Dirt Roads in the U.S.S.R.* by N. Fedorovsky seems to be of less value to the specialist, since a greater part of this book is concerned with the technical aspects of road texture as affecting the negotiability of dirt roads in general. This information is readily available from other sources. The book analyses the properties of various soils found in Russia, many of which differ but slightly from the properties of similar soils found in other countries.

A feature of the book is the study of temperatures and precipitation in various parts of Russia; of the periods of spring thaws affecting the melting of the snows, the breaking of

ice on the rivers, and the spring floods. This part of the study may be useful to students of navigation on the rivers and canals of the U.S.S.R.

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ALLEN, W. E. D., and MURATOFF, PAUL. *Caucasian Battlefields—A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1953. 614 pp. \$14.00.

Few countries have kept alive the tradition of the gentleman-scholar, to whom civilization owes so much, as well as has England. It is a tradition difficult to preserve at a time when knowledge, and scholarship as one of its principal instruments, are increasingly regarded not so much as a means of enriching the mind and the spirit, but as tools for the attainment of power and wealth. The state and the private institutions which acquire ever greater control over research, tend quite naturally to view their functions in terms of political and social betterment, and hence to stress the purely utilitarian aspects of scholarship. In the long run, such a condition may do irreparable harm to civilization which has always depended for its development largely on the efforts of individuals determined to satisfy their curiosity regardless whether or not it does anyone any "good."

It is to such a gentleman-scholar, John Baddeley, that we owe our best English books on the Caucasus. Mr. Allen—businessman, diplomat, and scholar—worthily continues

Baddeley's work. The present book, undertaken with the late Paul Muratoff to supplement Baddeley's classic *Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*, is Mr. Allen's second work in Caucasian history, his first, the *History of the Georgian People*, having appeared in 1932.

In nearly all the Russian wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Caucasus had served as an arena for military action. While this action was never of decisive influence on the outcome of wars, the fact that it was confined to a relatively limited geographic area and that the history of the conflicts between the same opponents, Russia and Turkey, stretched over a period of an entire century, makes it possible to draw from it interesting military conclusions. Nothing can please a military historian better than a situation in which all the extraneous elements, which usually affect the outcome of combat, are reduced to a minimum, and strategy assumes an all-important place. This is the case in the Caucasus.

The present work is largely a straight account of military campaigns, narrated at times with considerable detail, and the bulk of its contents is devoted to the description of battles and sieges. At times, however, there are interesting insights into the diplomatic background of Russo-Turkish wars. The authors emphasize, in the course of their description of World War I, the influence of political considerations on Turkish and German strategy. They indicate the role played by Pan-Turanian ideals in Enver Pasha's military plans, and the desire of the Germans to use the Turks for the purpose of diverting the Western Allies and the Russians.

They are highly critical of Enver's military abilities, and have harsh words to say of the willingness of the Ottoman leaders and their German counsellors to sacrifice countless lives to no purpose.

Messrs. Allen and Muratoff stress the hardships attending military operations in the Caucasian region ("War in the borderland between the Caucasus and the mountain ranges covering the approaches to the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux has essentially the character of mountain war"), and demonstrate how successive generations of Russian and Turkish fighters, operating in the same region, have managed to overcome natural obstacles. In each successive war, climate and terrain decreased in importance, while staff-work and supply increased in importance. This development tended to work to the advantage of the Russians, whose generalship and logistics were always superior to those of the Turks, thus permitting them to get the better of their opponent, who relied more on natural obstacles and the superb defensive qualities of his troops.

A strange omission in a work of such thoroughness is the authors' neglect of the 1915 massacres suffered by the Armenians at the hands of the Turks. Though not directly within the purview of military history, the slaughter of one million human beings living in the war zone and suffering as an immediate consequence of the war, surely deserved mention.

The book is sumptuously printed, and is equipped with handsome maps, photographs, and an excellent bibliography on the Caucasus.

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JABLONOWSKI, HORST, and PHILIPP, WERNER. *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, Vol. I. Berlin, Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität, 1954. 316 pp. 29 M.

The Freie Universität Berlin is, of the universities of the free world, geographically nearest to that vast region of Eastern Europe which has fallen in successive stages from November, 1917 to February, 1948 under Communist control and thus lost to Western scholarship. It is therefore appropriate that special attention is given in Berlin to Russian and Eastern European studies. After 1918 the Osteuropa Institut in Königsberg, then the eastern-most German university, was well known for its publications. Now the Osteuropa Institut in Berlin is taking its place. Its publications are divided into two groups. The one, for Slavic languages and literatures, is edited by Max Vasmer and has, so far, published six volumes; the other, dealing with historical problems, has just published its first volume, a collection of papers under the title *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, edited by Horst Jablonowski and Werner Philipp who had taught in Breslau and Mainz before being called as Professor of Russian History to the Free University. This first volume promises well for the whole series which should form a most valuable addition to the still sparse literature on Russian history in the Western languages.

The volume contains seven essays, all of them dealing with Russian history. Only one, and the least important, a lecture by Edward H. Carr on the historical foundations of Soviet foreign policy, discusses Communist Russia. In view of the

recent overemphasis on Russian developments and conditions of the last few decades, this is a very welcome trend, for the present-day Soviet Union cannot be understood or effectively dealt with without an ever deeper knowledge of the history and the intellectual growth and problems of the Great Russian and other peoples who have formed part of the Muscovite and St. Petersburg empires, the heir of which is the U.S.S.R. Fittingly, the present volume is introduced by a lecture on "The Historical Presuppositions of Political Thought in Russia" with which Professor Philipp inaugurated the Osteuropa Institut on November 24, 1951. Conditions and traditions have produced a definite political mentality in Russia which goes back for several centuries without, however, having crystallized into political theories or thought, the latter being a product of Russia's nineteenth century contact with Europe. The Russian distrust of the West, the cult and consciousness of the precedence of the community over the individual, the recognition of the unlimited power of governmental authority over society, and the discrepancy between political reality and the professed ideal aim, all these phenomena of Soviet thought and life have their roots in conditions which developed in Russia between the beginning of the thirteenth and the end of the sixteenth centuries.

One of the seven essays is, by length and importance, a monograph rather than an article. Konrad Pfalzgraf discusses in one hundred and fifty pages Danilevsky's radicalization of the problem of Russia and Europe. Until recently, Danilevsky has been little studied in the West. Lately, he has become

the subject of several dissertations in the various Institutes of Russian Studies in the United States, and I have tried in my *Pan-Slavism, its History and Ideology* to show Danilevsky's central position in the transition from a religious Slavophilism discoursing harmony and love to a "scientific" Slavophilism, stressing inescapable laws of history and the inevitability of conflict. It would be most difficult to establish any connection between men like Khomyakov and the Communists, whereas it is possible to point out similarities of thought between Danilevsky and the official writers of the age of Stalin. Dr. Pfalzgraf's monograph is a highly competent and well documented study not only of Danilevsky's ideas but also of their background in earlier Russian thought and of their effects upon Russian politics and theories in the decades preceding the First World War. Vladimir Soloviev, who subjected Danilevsky's Slavophilism to a famous and devastating criticism, expressed the view that Danilevsky's theory of history had been influenced by Heinrich Rückert who was professor of history in Breslau from 1852 to his death in 1875 and who published a *Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte in organischer Darstellung* in 1857. Dr. Pfalzgraf proves, with very good arguments, that Soloviev exaggerated Rückert's influence very much. Though Danilevsky generally depended upon German historicism (which makes his whole approach very alien to the Western reader), he introduced an important new and original element, the application of biology to cultural history, through which he became the forerunner of Spengler.

The most interesting contribution in the present volume is the lecture

by a young American scholar, Theodore H. von Laue, on "Some Political Consequences of Russian Economic Planning around 1900." At that time Witte had clearly recognized that Russia could remain a great power only through industrialization. The whole authority of an autocratic government was used to force Western industrialization upon an unwilling and unprepared people, at the expense of the consumer and of agriculture. Witte's attempt failed, not only because of popular resistance but also, and above all, through insufficient support by the Court and the bureaucracy. As a result Russia entered the First World War industrially unprepared. But this forced industrialization strengthened in Russia the historically deep antipathy against the West. Slavophil nationalists and revolutionary radicals met in this antipathy. Even the Marxists, who accepted the need of a rapid industrialization, rejected the Western economic and social system and thus could mobilize the elemental repudiation of the Western industrial order for the sake of the revolution and of "socialist" industrialization. The Narodniki, like V. Vorontsov and S. N. Yuzhakov, used Marxist arguments to prove in the 1890's that the growing capitalism would ruin the Russian masses. Vorontsov demanded a socialist-planned economy to harmonize the industrial development with agriculture and public welfare, and Yuzhakov demanded Russia's leadership in a world revolution of the industrially backward agrarian nations against Western capitalism. Yuzhakov's idea of a world wide front against the West was taken up by Lenin as early as 1902. He based, however, as Stanley W. Page has shown in

The Russian Review of April, 1952, the revolutionary movement not upon the peasant masses but upon the much more active and more uprooted new industrial proletariat. The analysis of Witte's plans and methods and of the popular resistance to them throws much light not only upon Russian history and society of the twentieth century but also on the present attitudes of the whole non-Western world.

In an appendix which will be especially welcome to researchers and students in the field of Eastern-European history, the volume under review publishes 62 pages of a bibliography of the whole literature in the German language published between 1939 and 1952 concerning the history of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. These were partly the years when most of the German literature and periodicals were inaccessible to the Western scholars. It is to be hoped that the Osteuropa Institut in Berlin will continue to make available similar bibliographical surveys of current German publications on Eastern-European history.

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LEDNICKI, WACLAW. *Russia, Poland and The West. Essays in Literary and Cultural History.* New York, Roy Publishers, 1954. 419 pp. \$5.00.

There is no doubt that Professor Waclaw Lednicki, a prominent Slavic scholar, put a great deal of research and erudition into the essays on Chaadaiev, Mickiewicz, Krasinski, Dostoevsky, and various other writers collected in this volume. But all his scholarship does not prevent

the reader from feeling almost frustrated—as if Mr. Lednicki's display of penetration and ingenuity (often bordering on crossword-puzzle techniques) were missing the target and useless.

Mr. Lednicki did set himself a very definite aim, but he drove at it with such insistence that he defeated his own purpose. In his comparative studies of Russian and Polish authors he dealt with literature and made detailed analyses of texts; but his real objective, it would seem, was non-literary: he draws, or at least suggests, certain political conclusions.

In his preface Mr. Lednicki not only states that Poland "has been the outpost of the West" and the "*antemurale christianitatis*," and that "tense Europeanism is generally characteristic of every Polish intellectual," but he also speaks of the emergence of Russian culture in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century as an "invasion" which Western European thought "was ready to welcome" because it was "already wary and shaken." Mr. Lednicki believes that the "Russian outlook" laid emphasis on the power of irrational factors in life, and makes it obvious that this "outlook" was undermining European culture. He failed to explain, however, whether the currents represented by Nietzsche and Bergson or Proust and Joyce should also be regarded as the effects of Russian poison. In any case, Mr. Lednicki complains that the expansion of Russian influence was prejudicial to Poland: "against the background of the growing prestige of Russian art and culture,—ballet, novel, ikon, music,—Poland's insistence on her devotion to Western European cul-

ture and on her historical merits connected with the defense of that culture acquired all the features of unrequited love." Instead of putting the problem of cultural influence in such competitive terms, Mr. Lednicki should have simply acknowledged that devotion to the West and recognition of service are of no avail in such matters. One does not need to be a nationalist or "Russian imperialist" to surmise that the powerful and profound impact of Russian culture was simply due to the intellectual and artistic contributions of Russia to the West and to the world in the last century and were far greater and more important than those of Poland.

But such an objective statement is impossible for Mr. Lednicki because the general climate of his book, by blunt assertion or subtle hint, is unfavorable to Russia. Mr. Lednicki's bias explains such facts as his complacency toward *La Russie en 1839* by the Marquis de Custine, who did not speak Russian, stayed in the country but a short time and based his book on second-hand information. Mr. Lednicki must know that de Custine was unearthed recently for the purpose of anti-Russian propaganda, yet he takes seriously the sweeping generalizations of the Marquis who, by the way, declared that "creative genius has been denied" the Russian upper classes, and "the enthusiasm which produces the sublime is to them unknown."

The best part of the book is devoted to Dostoevsky, and Mr. Lednicki's analysis of various elements in the *Legend of the Grand Inquisitor* or in the *Notes from the Underground*, as well as his comments of some minor items of the

"small history" of literature, are often suggestive and illuminating. But as soon as he returns to his favorite subject, the influence of Polish writers on the Russians, he seems to lose all sense of proportion. (Incidentally, despite all my admiration for *Pan Tadeusz*, I can hardly concur in Mr. Lednicki's opinion that "it is the greatest European epic of the nineteenth century and the only modern work comparable to that of Homer.")

A comparative method is perfectly legitimate, and confrontation of writers of different nationalities often proves very fruitful. But when the comparisons are reduced to mere corroboration of an arbitrarily established thesis, when historical conditions and cultural environment are deliberately ignored, while no discrimination is made between stylistic parallelisms and ideological similarities, when external likeness is presented as deep affinity, and secondary themes as principal trends, then we have the right to demand extreme caution in following Professor Lednicki through the tortuous maze of his conjectures and suppositions.

In many instances he is so eager to prove his point that he refuses to consider contradictory evidence. For example, he knows well that parallel quotes from Chaadaiev and Mickiewicz do not prove anything, particularly if we remember that Chaadaiev wrote his "Philosophical Letter" before the time he could have read Mickiewicz, and there is no indication that the two men ever met. Yet Mr. Lednicki can not resist making a supreme effort: "I still cannot avoid the temptation to admit the possibility that Mickiewicz and Chaadaiev met." What

makes Mr. Lednicki's obstinacy completely unnecessary is the fact that we do not need the unfounded conjecture of a meeting between the Polish poet and the Russian thinker to establish a link between their opinions because we know that they had common sources and common masters, besides breathing the air of the same period. Likewise, when Mr. Lednicki tries to find a casual connection between Mickiewicz' "Suburb of The Capital" and Dostoevsky's description of St. Petersburg, without giving any proof that Dostoevsky ever read the Polish poem, he sounds utterly unconvincing. It is obvious that we can speak of Gogol's and not of Mickiewicz' influence in this matter. In another part of his book Mr. Lednicki quotes Shatov in *The Possessed* who speaks of the shaky foundations of Russia and of its cornerstones, the balance of which could be upset by the wind, and compares it to Mickiewicz' verse in which the Polish poet depicts Russia as a cascade, frozen in its course, threatening to melt under the action of sun and warm wind. Poetically the similes of the cascade and of the cornerstone have nothing in common, but Mr. Lednicki once again succumbs to temptation and affirms: "Dostoevsky's imagery and his metaphors are exactly the same as those of Mickiewicz."

Mr. Lednicki is so absorbed by his hunt for clues that he disregards historical and cultural context and seems to pay no attention to the fact that many literary parallelisms are caused by the similarity of life material and of models used by different artists. A typical example of his method is given by the essay on Alexander Blok's "Revenge," a

poem of Russian destiny, of the fate of Russian intelligentsia, and of their historical responsibility in succeeding generations. Out of this poetic and ideological complexity Mr. Lednicki separated one chapter and, because of its Warsaw setting (perfectly understandable in the light of Blok's biography), and a couple of sentences about "God-forsaken and lacerated Poland," called it Blok's "Polish poem," and suggested that Poland was the main theme of the whole work. Here again he goes to all sorts of literary parallelisms and detection, including the building-up of the figure of Count Rozwadowski who appears for a fleeting moment in Blok's life. It is typical that Mr. Lednicki must find a Polish friend in order to explain the poet's "Polonophilism," but he does not say anything about Blok's association with those populist and socialist circles which supported the independence and freedom of Poland. Here is an example of Mr. Lednicki's operation: Blok mentioned in his letter from Europe that there was a Polish library and a small Mickiewicz museum in Paris. The book of visitors of the museum, duly checked, did not show Blok's signature. After reporting this fact, Mr. Lednicki adds: "He [Blok] had, however, evidently been in the museum." Why "evidently," and what is the evidence? Of course, this is a detail, but the volume is full of such details, and they are typical of this tendentious work. It is a pity, because this very tendentiousness mars a work which otherwise could have been informative, interesting, and useful.

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BOURYSCHKINE, PAUL A. *Moskva kupecheskaya*. New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1954, 349 pp. \$3.00.

ZILOTI, VERA P. *V dome Tretiakova*. New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1954, 347 pp. \$2.75.

These two books complement each other in offering highly interesting information on the most neglected group in Russia's social history, the bourgeoisie.

Mr. Bouryschkine, who was born in 1887 in Moscow and died in 1953 in Paris, was himself a member of this class. His book includes personal recollections of his life and activities as a newspaper editor, Red Cross administrator, and high ranking official in the administrative apparatus of the city of Moscow. These reminiscences are not very systematically arranged, but are valuable as the personal impressions of a close and astute observer of political and social events which preceded the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

By far the greater merit of the book lies, however, in the chapter on the leading families in Moscow's industrial and trading world, based on firsthand and intimate knowledge of this group by Mr. Bouryschkine. This chapter covers one third of the total length of the book and one wishes it were longer. The author lists some twenty five families in order of relative importance and prestige, placing the Morozovs, Bakhrushins, Naidenovs, Tretiakovs, and Shchukins at the top of the ladder. He speaks of these families as "dynasties." Each was leading its own separate life in a closed circle of relatives and friends without seeking contact with other "dynasties" unless bound to them

by marriage. This custom was a relic of the old patriarchal pattern of family life prevalent in ancient Muscovy among all classes of society.

What elevated a family of commercial or industrial entrepreneurs to the top rungs of the social ladder was not wealth alone, but the employ of a considerable portion of this wealth in cultural, artistic, or charitable ventures. Savva T. Morozov was responsible for the financial survival of the Moscow Art Theatre. Aleksei A. Bakhrushin founded the equally famous Theatrical Museum. Nikolai A. Naidenov edited and financed a ten-volume collection of documents on the history of the Moscow merchants and a six-volume photographic album of Moscow's churches. Pavel M. Tretiakov founded the Art Gallery bearing his name. Sergei I. Shchukin assembled a unique collection of French impressionistic paintings. Similar achievements outside the realm of business are credited to the other families mentioned by Mr. Bouryschkine.

This becomes particularly impressive if viewed against the genealogical background of these families. Almost without exception, they had come as enserfed peasants or petty merchants from provincial areas to the capital of Moscow at the end of the eighteenth or at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The rise to financial prominence and high cultural standards had thus been accomplished in two or, at the most, three generations; a far cry from Dobrolubov's *Kingdom of Darkness* or Gorky's degenerating family enterprise of the *Artamonovs*.

The history of Russian culture is thus inseparable from the history of the Russian bourgeoisie. The business world stimulated, inspired, and

nurtured the world of art. This is the author's central theme and he has performed an inestimable service to the student of Russian history and culture by formulating and substantiating this statement in such vivid and diversified terms.

While Mr. Bouryschkine's book presents an over-all picture of Moscow's top business world, Mrs. Ziloti introduces us to one of its component units, the "dynasty" of the Tretiakovs. Vera Ziloti was the oldest daughter of Pavel M. Tretiakov. Her mother came from another prominent merchant family of Moscow, that of the Manontovs. The artistic interests of the Manontov family centered on music. "Musical talent and Mamontovs were almost synonyms in Moscow" states Mrs. Ziloti. It was in the private opera company of Savva I. Mamontov, first cousin of Mrs. Ziloti's mother, for instance, that Shaliapin began to be appreciated and was launched upon his fabulous career.

The author tells of her childhood and youth, up to her marriage to the pianist, Alexander Ziloti. Whatever the setting she describes, be it the town residence of the Tretiakovs in Moscow, or the country houses rented over the years by the family for the summer, or European cities visited on trips abroad with her parents, painting and music are inseparably interwoven with her recollections. Vivid flashes of the personality of a composer like Chaikovsky, or artists such as Repin, Surikov, Perov, Vereshchagin, to name only a few, testify how close indeed was the relation between the world of art and the world of business in Russia during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

After the Revolution the Zilotis became emigres. Mrs. Ziloti died in

1940 in New York, her husband five years later. Tretiakov's second daughter, Alexandra, married to a physician, Sergei S. Botkin, however, remained in Russia. There, she too, wrote a book about her father: *Pavel Mikhailovich Tretiakov v zhizni i iskustve*, Moscow, 1951. It is richly illustrated with reproductions of paintings from the Tretiakov Gallery, family photographs, and carries lengthy excerpts from pertinent correspondence. However, it lacks the warm, natural, and unrestrained atmosphere of Mrs. Ziloti's book, who was looking back upon the past from a vantage point far this side of the Iron Curtain. The books of the two sisters make absorbing reading.

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BERLIN, ISAIAH. *The Hedgehog and the Fox*. New York, Simon & Shuster, 1953. 86 pp. \$2.50.

There is an enigmatical line from the Greek poet, Archilochus, which says: "The fox knows many tricks, but the hedgehog one great one." The defensive hedgehog thinks and feels in terms of a single, all-embracing principle, but the cunning fox pursues many ends, often unrelated, and even contradictory. Mr. Berlin gives the following list of "hedgehogs" in Western thought: Dante, Plato, Lucretius, Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Ibsen, and Proust. His "foxes" are: Herodotus, Aristotle, Montaigne, Erasmus, Molière, Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac, and Joyce.

The author offers the very suggestive hypothesis that Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in

being a hedgehog. As a fox-wise master of literary art, perhaps the greatest of the nineteenth century, he painted a great variety of life-like characters of men and even animals. He rejected every rationalist explanation offered by philosophers and historians of all times. They all were equally narrow-minded, he affirmed. But in order to make diverse and divided mankind happy Tolstoy preached anarchy based partly on the principle of the single-tax introduced by the American, Henry George, and partly on the Gospel interpreted in a rationalist manner, as a code of morals only.

Unlike many other critics, Mr. Berlin takes Tolstoy's view of history seriously. I should add that Tolstoy does not admit the very existence of History. Most historical concepts take for granted the fact of development, infinite or finite, concluded by the Last Judgement or by a cosmic catastrophe. But for Tolstoy there is no development. Instead of evolution or revolution he sees hideous disorder, lies, and injustice everywhere. Tolstoy, the moralist, disdained all renowned fools (Napoleon, for example), and especially in the last period of his life, tried to convince mankind that it should cease writing this nonsense about history and historical heroes.

Tolstoy's message cannot be considered the extravagant caprice of a Russian country gentleman who despised such parvenues as Bonaparte and his Russian admirer, Speransky. His dislike of vain, ambitious, and ideological generalizations of all kinds may appeal to the intellectually suspicious generation of our time. Moreover, Tolstoy the artist, is also able to offer something positive to the sceptical aesthete of the middle twentieth cen-

tury who has an almost pagan passion for life expressed by the Cossack, Yeroshka, or by the brave Caucasian mountaineer, Hadzhy-Murad, or by the singing, dancing, loving, and sometimes spontaneously self-sacrificing young Russian lady, Natasha Rostova.

Tolstoy is really a wise fox running through woods and pastures of his enormous native country. But this cunning fox was mortally wounded, not by the vacuous, chattering, and sometimes very dangerous fools of History, but by the omnipotent presence of silent death and by the ugly demons of sex. He could not endure Death and Sex. The bleeding fox was forced to adopt the very superficial, rationalist system of a hedgehog: the dubiously protective theory of non-resistance to evil and the feeble image of the kingdom of the meek. Mr. Berlin does not mention the well-known real reasons for Tolstoy's metamorphosis from a fox to a hedgehog, but both similes used by him remain vivid and suggestive for all future discussions of his life and work.

Very few people followed Tolstoy's doctrine. Ghandi liked the "wise man of the North" very much but, still, the former was a politician, a dubious personality, if we recall Tolstoy's disgust with politics. Tolstoy's ethics helped in part to disintegrate Imperial Russia, ruled by a senile and rather mild autocracy, frightened by the red ghost of anarchy. His nihilist attitude toward all established institutions would not compromise with Russia's particular social and political system, nor with the concept of discipline and methodical training. Teachers, physicians, social workers, lawyers, even writers (including Shakespeare), all people of learning, had been ridi-

culated and unmasked by the heavy irony of Tolstoy. He trusted simple people the most. The strong, bear-like rather than fox-like Tolstoy shook the fragile pillars of a temple called *kultur* in Germany and tradition, elsewhere. In Russia those pillars were built and shaped by the poet Pushkin and by some of his contemporaries. Pushkin disliked learned pedantry more than Tolstoy himself, but he remained well-balanced while facing trouble and death. On the other hand, Tolstoy, the nihilist, the enemy of tradition, sometimes played the role of "a boy without pants." That individual is an amusing fictional character of the Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin (1826-1889) who contrasted him to a German boy wearing pants. If all men may be divided into foxes and hedgehogs, they may also be divided into boys with pants and without pants. The dressed ones are: Aristotle, St. Paul, St. Thomas, Erasmus, Voltaire, Hegel, Pushkin, and Turgenev. The half-dressed or even naked are: Diogenes, the author of the *Apocalypse*, St. Francis, Savonarola, Rousseau, Kirkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy. In pre-revolutionary Russia the self-criticizing, self-despising intelligentsia, including many great writers headed by Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, was always ready to be swallowed by the very idealized, good, ragged peasants, and disliked the "pants of civilization" which Pushkin wore without pangs of conscience. The witty and gloomy D. H. Lawrence in *Fate and the Young Generation* is quite right in saying: "Anyhow the Tolstoyan lot simply asked for extinction. 'Eat me up, dear peasant!' So the peasant ate him."

Reading the list above, we see that in Western Europe there were

many nonconforming men of genius who also despised the conventional forms of thought and dress. But all of them could be placed within the frame of *kultur* or tradition. In Russia it was different, and still is different, but not forever, I think.

Finally, I have to add that the similarity between Tolstoy and the paradoxical ultramontane Count Joseph de Maistre, stressed by Mr. Berlin, is logically developed but it leaves one unconvinced. Maistre, the Catholic Voltaire of the French counter-revolution, was a boy wearing those pants which Tolstoy, the Russian Rousseau, despised so much.

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Oxford Slavonic Papers, Volume V.
Ed. by S. KONOVALOV. Oxford,
The Clarendon Press, 1954. 144
pp. 12/6.

This is one of the most interesting of the annual volumes in this important series which, despite its title, is devoted primarily to Russian subjects.

The first third of this volume concerns Professor George Vernadsky: an article by him, a review article of the first three volumes of his *History of Russia* and a bibliography of his works. Professor Vernadsky's article, the most important in the volume, reviews the evidence concerning the death of Tsarevich Dmitry Ivanovich. He shows that most historians, following the tradition established by seventeenth-century chronicles and eighteenth-century historians, accepted by Karamzin and sanctioned by Pushkin, have considered Boris Godunov either unquestionably, or most

likely, guilty of the Tsarevich's death. To do so, historians have had to ignore or deprecate the most important evidence in the case, the report of the official commission of inquiry which investigated the death. This report was first published in 1819, but in a confused form which gave rise to serious doubts of its reliability. Obscurities and inconsistencies, Vernadsky maintains, were caused by lost or misplaced pages in the original record. He goes on to show that all of the eight eyewitnesses of Dmitry's death testified that he accidentally fell on a knife when overcome by an epileptic fit. The Tsaritsa and Mikhail Nagoy, her brother, testified that Dmitry was murdered, but by their own admission they were not witnesses, and others testified that the alleged assassins were elsewhere at the time of Dmitry's death. Vernadsky presents the case for accidental death convincingly, and his analysis will require many historians to revise their views.

Dimitri Obolensky's review of Vernadsky's *Ancient Russia*, *Kievan Russia*, and *The Mongols and Russia* is essentially a sympathetic summary of the views expressed in these volumes, although the reviewer balks at accepting Vernadsky's "Tmutorokan Kaganate," his etymology of 'Rus' and his reconstruction of a Donets-Don riverway as the original path of Varangian expansion in Russia.

The second third of this volume is centered on Vyacheslav Ivanov, including an article and bibliography by O. Deschartes and the Russian text of forty-one previously unpublished sonnets. Deschartes' article offers a very brief biographical sketch of the poet and attempts to assess his significance in Russian

literary history. The author promises another article analyzing Ivanov's philosophical system, barely touched here. More important are the sonnets. Most were written between 1915 and 1920 or in the winter of 1924-1925. They display all the technical perfection and philosophical depth that readers would expect of Vyacheslav Ivanov, and we can rejoice they they finally have seen light.

The final forty-odd pages of the volume cover miscellaneous topics. Nadejda Gorodetsky's biographical essay on Princess Zinaida Volkonsky, the favorite of Alexander I, who became a religious mystic and the benefactress of several religious enterprises in Rome, clarifies this seemingly contradictory personality. The study is based in part on new source material, especially relating to her later life as a Roman Catholic. B. O. Unbegaun reviews three recent

Soviet textbooks on the history of the Russian language and two specialized studies on sixteenth and seventeenth century Russian, finding the specialized studies of more consequence.

The remaining articles are devoted to archival material. D. P. Costello presents two diplomatic notes by Griboyedov, written in 1820 during his first tour of duty in Persia. They refer to an inconsequential incident, but cast some light on young Griboyedov's personality. More interesting is the proposal made in 1631 by an English adventurer that England establish a protectorate over Russia, published with background information by S. Konovalov. Finally, Marin Tadin completes a survey of the five Glagolitic manuscripts in the Bodleian Library.

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